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 The purpose of this thesis is to design a new role for security intelligence in new 
democracies that achieves a proper balance between the security of the state, the 
intelligence activities, and the individual liberties of its citizens. 
 In this sense, a democratic intelligence system should have a clear legal mandate 
for its functions and should be controlled and overseen by civilians under democratic 
principles, such as respect for the rule of law and human rights, accountability and 
transparency. 
 This thesis compares the intelligence systems of Argentina, Romania, and El 
Salvador under their different regimes, authoritarian as well as democratic. It also 
compares the strategies used by Argentina and Romania for their transitions from 
authoritarian intelligence systems to democratic intelligence systems. After comparing 
both the strategies used by these nations, one sees that designing a new model, a 
collaborative strategy, which includes all stakeholders, is the most appropriate approach, 
leaving the democratically elected authorities to employ an authoritative strategy when 
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 Nowadays a major political goal is consolidating new democracies. This requires 
vast changes of several issues, such as socio economic development, social justice, 
respect of human rights, and the armed forces under democratic control. Perhaps with the 
military changes and the new role of the armed forces, one of the most difficult tasks is 
the control and oversight of intelligence.  
During authoritarian regimes, intelligence systems were under the oversight and 
execution of the military institutions. Using the protection of the state as an excuse, they 
were key elements of political control through the abuse of human rights, acting against 
individual freedom and mainly against the principles of democracy. 
In a democracy, political power, and ultimately control of the government, is 
vested with the citizenry, but how much control can the public maintain when it does not 
know what the government is doing? 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS      
· How should an intelligence system in a new democracy be structured to 
serve both the need for security and a respect for human rights? 
· How can an authoritarian intelligence system be transformed into a 
democratic intelligence system? Who has to control intelligence? Who has to 
oversight? To what degree should secrecy be applied? 
 xvi 
· What strategy should be used to design a new role and structure of security 
intelligence for new democracies? 
 
C. MAIN FINDINGS 
· Intelligence systems under different types of authoritarian regimes were 
similar in three ways, behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally. The 
intense violations of human and civil rights required changing the mandate, 
the structure, and the oversight of the intelligence systems in democratic 
transitions. 
· The strategies used to change were collaborative, in the case of Argentine, 
and authoritative in the case of Romania. Argentine has advanced more in 
consolidating its democracy. On the other hand, Romania still has a weak 
civil society characterized by its lack of confidence in the government, which 
has appointed the former authoritarian officers to conduct intelligence. This 
is a constant reminder of the past threatening the process of consolidating 
Romania’s hopes for democracy. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS    
· To be sure, intelligence is still required, but it should be refocused. Its tactics 
should be designed by the need to build a safer world, based on law and 
cooperation, efficiency, and quality. Intelligence operations should be less 
secret and more integrated with the needs of a democratic national and 
international policy. It is time to forge a new path, a new role: reaching a 
 xvii
proper balance between the security, the intelligence activities, and the 
individual liberties. 
· Civilians should control and oversee the democratic intelligence system 
under democratic principles, such as the respect for the rule of law and 
human rights, accountability and transparency. 
· Today, even with issues such as intelligence services, there is a need for a 
new way of working that should be more collaborative and democratic and 
should not rely on a small elite group for all the answers. Thus, for any 
stakeholders to design a new role, a collaborative strategy is the most 
appropriate one. However, in light of this, the intelligence officers must at 
times employ an authoritative strategy to execute all the functions that 
compose the gathering, analysis, dissemination, and consumption of 
intelligence.  
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As the world witnesses the birth of emerging democracies, the role of intelligence 
systems should be reevaluated. After decades of authoritarian regimes, military 
governments, secret intelligence systems and horrific abuses of human rights, these new 
democracies require open public debates and new legislative initiatives to ensure 
adequate civilian control over intelligence agencies.  
Clearly, regarding intelligence systems, nowadays the primary objectives are 
preventing abuses while protecting the nation’s interests. Thus a new role for the 
intelligence community entails achieving a proper balance between the security of the 
state, its intelligence activities, and the individual liberties of its citizens. 
Peter Gill summed up this role succinctly by stating we must construct, “a system 
which is capable of providing information about real threats without abusing human 
rights."1    
 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Nowadays, a major political goal of new democracies is consolidating their still 
fragile democracies. This requires vast changes of several issues, such as socio-economic 
development, social justice, respect of human rights, and the armed forces under 
democratic civilian control. Perhaps with the military changes and the new role of the 
armed forces, one of the most difficult tasks is the control and oversight of intelligence. 
                                                 
1 Peter Gill. Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State. Bookcraft 
Ltd. Midsomer Norton, Bath, 1994. P. 314 
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During authoritarian regimes, intelligence systems were under the oversight and 
execution of the heads of the states through the military institutions, as well as under the 
military institutions themselves. Using the protection of the state as an excuse, these 
autocratic leaders abused human rights, acting against individual freedom and mainly 
against the principles of democracy. 
Contrarily, in a democracy, political power and, ultimately, the control of the 
government is vested with the citizenry, but how much control can the public maintain 
when it does not know what the government is doing?   
 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
There is a wide international consensus about the need for democratic control 
over intelligence agencies and activities. In new democracies, discussing intelligence 
matters is no longer taboo. Its new role should be known by the people who put their 
confidence in their government, in a system of checks and balances, and in the principle 
of accountability. All the sectors of the population have a great challenge, but the first 
steps, perhaps the most difficult ones, have already been taken.  
Thus, this thesis describes the intelligence system of three different countries 
before and after their transitions to democracy and their strategies used to change from an 
authoritarian intelligence system to a democratic intelligence system. The thesis then 
compares the resulting models in order to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
these new models for intelligence services. 
This thesis also considers the following specific purposes: 
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1) To define and outline the intelligence community (What is it? What does it 
do? How does it fit in the government?) 
2) To illuminate the risks versus the anticipated gains involved in making 
decisions about intelligence operations.  
3) To examine the yet unsolved problem of how a democratic society, can 
exercise political control over activities that are necessarily secret. 
It is important then to analyze and to evaluate the processes used by Argentina 
and Romania to fulfill their changes (What the results were? Why was it necessary to 
make changes?) Thus, the primary aim of this thesis is to establish a model of intelligence 
that achieves the balance previously mentioned. 
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The answers to pressing social-political-economic-military questions, such as the 
ones presented below, often seem illusory. Frequently, proposed solutions are 
characterized as unfeasible because they are believed to be financially impossible, 
technologically out of reach, or mistrusted. 
· How should an intelligence system in a new democracy be structured to 
serve both the need for security and the respect for human rights? 
· How can an authoritarian intelligence system be transformed into a 
democratic intelligence system? Who has to control intelligence? Who has to oversight? 
To what degree should secrecy be applied?  
· What strategy should be used to design a new role and a structure of 
security intelligence for new democracies? 
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To answer the questions above, this thesis will explore the following major 
arguments: 
· An intelligence service, still required in a democracy, should be refocused. 
Its tactics should be based on law and cooperation, efficiency, and a commitment to build 
a safer world. Its operations should be less secret and more integrated with the needs of 
an open national and international policy. The execution of intelligence operations must 
seek a proper balance between the security of the state, the intelligence activities, and 
individual liberties. 
· Civilians should control a democratic intelligence system with democratic 
oversight respecting the rule of law, human rights, yet maintaining accountability and 
transparency. 
· Today, even with intelligence services, the functions of the government 
should be more collaborative and democratic and should not rely on a small elite of 
decision-makers. Thus the design of the new role should be based on a collaborative 
strategy, leaving any authoritative strategy merely for the execution of intelligence 
operations.    
 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this thesis will be a structured, focusing on a 
comparison of the Intelligence Services of Argentina and Romania, as they functioned 
before the political changes in these countries. This thesis will also examine how these 
nations are currently solving their problems. Then with these findings, the thesis presents 
a new model for new democracies, such as the one in El Salvador.  
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Why compare Argentina and Romania? Such a comparison permits an analysis of 
different political systems such as Argentina’s authoritarian-capitalist and Romania’s 
authoritarian-communist. This comparison shows that intelligence systems under 
different authoritarian regimes are very similar. It also permits the study of an 
unconsolidated democracy or new democracy, such as the one in El Salvador. The 
challenge of such a comparison is explaining the differences in the timing of the 
centralization of power, detailing the conditions under which leaders succeed or fail, and 
determining the rationale behind more democratic or authoritarian outcomes.    
According to Michael Mann, an explanation requires two elements: the 
comparative and the historical.2 In this thesis no major contradictions arise by applying 
Mann’s concept. Furthermore the following Chapters suggest that a marriage between the 
comparative and historical explanations offer a most promising avenue for analyzing this 
topic. 
The goal of the study is developing the best possible model to define the new role 
of intelligence. This model should be applicable to new democracies such as in El 
Salvador. This thesis will analyze different literature available in the countries, official 
documents and intelligence reports, not available to the general public. This thesis also 
relies on data obtained through personal interviews of national leaders, especially in El 
Salvador.  
 
                                                 
2 Michael J. Mann, Harvey J. Goldschmid, J. Fred Weston. Industrial Concentration: The New 
Learning. Little, Brown, Boston, 1974, viii.  
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E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The following is a brief discussion of the organization of this thesis and of how 
each chapter answers the research questions. 
Chapter II is devoted to general theoretical considerations, which while of direct 
relevance for the rest of the thesis, can be read as freestanding theoretical arguments. 
Chapter II also defines “intelligence,” why it is necessary, its general process in gathering 
information, and its role in a perilous world. This Chapter also describes the role and 
structure of an intelligence system under authoritarian as well as democratic regimes, 
using some variables, such as “behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally.” These 
variables will be useful in analyzing the role and structure of intelligence in both periods.  
Chapter III identifies the role and structure of security intelligence as a wicked 
problem to be solved. This Chapter refers to the stakeholders, to the strategy needed to 
cope with this wicked problem, and to the implementation of a plan. This Chapter is 
important because it outlines a democratic process, labeled "collaborative strategy," 
which is useful for designing new roles in different countries according to their demands. 
However, this Chapter also outlines how intelligence officers can apply an “authoritative 
strategy” under the principles of the rule of law, transparency and accountability to 
execute the functions.  
Chapter IV, using the same variables, analyzes the intelligence system in 
Argentina, Romania, and El Salvador under their authoritarian regimes. Establishing 
some characteristics of the abuses committed by these intelligence services, which were 
similar and intense. This intensity, in the three cases under study, exacerbated the 
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population and contributed to both the negative and eventually to the positive changes 
within their intelligence systems. 
Chapter V presents the intelligence systems of the same countries under their 
democratic regimes. This Chapter also emphasizes why it has been a wicked problem for 
these countries to change from authoritarian to democratic intelligence systems. The 
Chapter also examines the strategies used by Argentina and Romania to perform their 
changes. The main purpose of this Chapter is to determine whether the strategy to change 
from the authoritarian to the democratic intelligence system developed in Argentina and 
Romania can be effectively applied in new democracies to face this wicked problem.   
Chapter VI concludes the research and addresses the key issues of this work, 
namely creating a new role and structure for emerging democracies.  
Chapter VII presents the new role and structure of an intelligence system for new 
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II. INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW 
 
 
A.  WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 
To many people, “intelligence” seems little different from information, except 
that intelligence is probably secret. However, distinguishing between the two is essential. 
Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it may be discovered. 
However, intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of 
policy makers and has been collected, refined, and narrowed to meet those needs. 
Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Therefore, intelligence and 
the entire process by which it is defined, obtained, and analyzed is a response to the needs 
of policy makers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.           
There are several ways to consider intelligence: intelligence as a process, 
intelligence as a product, and intelligence as an organization. 
· Intelligence as a Process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by 
which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated. Intelligence is also the manner in which certain types of covert actions are 
conceived and conducted.3 
· Intelligence as a Product : Intelligence can be considered the product of 
these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.4 
                                                 
3 Mark M. Lowenthal. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ. Press, Washington, D.C., 1999. 
P. 8. 
4 Ibid., p. 8. 
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· Intelligence as an Organization: Intelligence can also be considered as the 
governmental agencies that perform its various functions.5 
For the purposes of this thesis, intelligence will be defined according to the 
definition presented by Mark M. Lowenthal. Thus, "Intelligence is the process by which 
specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, 
analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of 
these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying 
out of operations as requested by lawful authorities."6  
 
B.  WHY DO WE NEED INTELLIGENCE? 
Intelligence exists for at least four major reasons: 1) to avoid strategic surprise, 2) 
to provide long-term expertise, 3) to support the policy process, and 4) to maintain the 
secrecy of information, needs, and methods.7  
· To Avoid Strategic Surprise: The foremost goal of any intelligence 
community must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that have 
the ability to threaten the nation's existence.  
· To Provide Long-Term Expertise: Even though policy makers may enter 
their respective offices with considerable background in their fields, being well versed in 
all issues with which they will be dealing is virtually impossible. Inevitably, these policy-
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 8.   
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
7 Ibid., p. 2.   
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makers will face issues for which they must summon others with superior knowledge and 
expertise. For national security matters much knowledge and expertise resides in the 
intelligence community, where the analytical cadre is relatively stable.  According to 
Lowenthal, 8  
 Stability tends to be greater in intelligence agencies than in foreign affairs 
and defense agencies. Also, the higher reaches of the intelligence 
community tend to be more stable and to have many fewer political 
appointees than the State and Defense Departments. 
 
· To Support the Policy Process: Policy makers have a constant need for 
tailored, timely intelligence that will give them background, context, information, 
warning and an assessment of risks, benefits, and the likely outcomes. The intelligence 
community fulfills the policy makers’ needs. In the ethos of intelligence, a strict division 
exists between intelligence and policy. The two entities are seen as separate functions. 
The government is run by the policy makers, and intelligence is supportive but may not 
encroach on or advocate policy choices. Intelligence officers who support policy makers 
are expected to maintain objectivity regarding specific policies, choices, or outcomes. 
Failing to do might threaten the objectivity of their analyses, creating a "politicized 
intelligence." 
· To Maintain the Secrecy of Information, Needs, and Methods: Secrecy 
does make intelligence unique. Having intelligence agencies is of vital importance. First, 
all countries need certain types of information and wish to keep their needs secret. 
Secondly, all countries need to keep secret their means by which to obtain information.  
 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
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C.  PROCESS OF INTELLIGENCE  
As previously defined, intelligence is a dynamic and never ending process. Seven 
steps basically compose it: 1) needs or requirements, 2) collection, 3) processing and 
exploitation, 4) analysis and production, 5) dissemination, 6) consumption, and 7) 
feedback.9 Let’s examine each category individually: 
· Needs or Requirements: Identifying requirements means defining those 
policy issues or areas to which intelligence is expected to contribute. Identifying 
requirements may also mean specifying the collection of certain types of intelligence. All 
policy areas have intelligence requirements; however, these requirements must be sorted 
by priorities, with some getting more attention, some getting less, and some perhaps 
getting little or no attention at all. The key issues are based on two questions: First, who 
sets these requirements and priorities and then conveys them to the intelligence 
community? Secondly, what happens, or should happen, if policy makers fail to set these 
requirements on their own? 
· Collection: Once the requirements and priorities have been established, 
the necessary intelligence must be collected. The key issues here are also based on two 
questions: First, what types of collection should be used? Secondly, how much can or 
should be collected to meet each requirement? To collect information, the agency 
employs several techniques, such as imagery (IMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), 
human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and 
open-source intelligence (OSINT). 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 41- 49. 
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· Processing and Exploitation: Intelligence collected by technical or human 
means, such as imagery, signals, test data, and so on does not arrive in ready-to-use form. 
Such intelligence must be processed and exploited, that is, processed from complex 
signals into images or intercepts. These then must be exploited and analyzed if they are 
images, perhaps decoded and probably translated if they are signals. Processing and 
exploitation are key steps in converting technically collected information into useful 
intelligence. 
· Analysis and Production: The previous steps are meaningless unless the 
intelligence is assigned to analysts, who can turn the various types of collected 
intelligence into a variety of reports (products) that the policy makers can use. The types 
of product chosen, the quality of the analysis, and the continuous tension between current 
intelligence products and longer-range products are key issues. 
· Dissemination: This is the process of moving the intelligence from the 
analysts to the policy makers. How widely intelligence should be distributed and how 
urgently it should be passed or flagged for the policy maker's attention are key issues in 
dissemination. 
· Consumption: This refers to the use of the information by the policy 
makers or users to create policies to benefit the society.  
· Feedback: Feedback is the interaction between policy makers and analysts 
regarding the finished intelligence. The purpose of the feedback is to review what has be 
done by the intelligence analysts in order to achieve better outcomes The analysts help 
intelligence managers evaluate the effectiveness of intelligence community support, 














feedback doesn't occur nearly as often as the intelligence community might desire, this 
process involves in-depth communication between policy makers and intelligence 
analysts after the intelligence has been generated. Feedback is essential because it 
informs the intelligence community as to how well they are meeting the needs of the 
policy makers. During feedback both parties discuss any adjustments that must be made. 
In this process some questions are essential, such as what has been useful, what has not, 
which areas need continued or increased emphasis, which areas can be reduced? and so 
on. The following diagram, Figure 1, shows the process of intelligence. This diagram has 
been designed by the author of this thesis. It is based on Lowenthal’s Multilayered 
Intelligence Process.10 
Figure 1. Process of Intelligence 
 
D.  THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 
Even by adopting more relaxed security policies, in light of the diminished 
number of security threats, in the future nations will inevitable face new security threats. 
In a dangerous, turbulent, and unpredictable world, the intelligence agencies will be the 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 51. 
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first line of protection, and their effectiveness will largely determine how many nations 
survive or perish. 
To improve the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies, two guidelines will be 
necessary. First, the intelligence agencies should focus on genuine threats to national 
security, such as terrorism, and not on such issues as trade negotiations. Second, at the 
political level, the president and his advisors should view the intelligence agencies as 
institutions that are most valuable when they bring into question the premises of existing 
policy. Admittedly, adopting such a role is challenging, but history demonstrates the 
perilous consequences of refusing to believe intelligence that contradicts the views of the 
political leadership.  
For instance, this was clearly the case in 1914 when the breadth and power of the 
Schlieffen Plan caught the French Commander- in-Chief General Joseph Joffre by 
surprise. Likewise, in 1940, General Maurice Gamelin’s Dyle-Breda Plan was shattered 
by an unexpected German attack through the Ardennes.11 The problem for French 
intelligence was not that the decision-makers whom they served willfully ignored their 
reports charting the strength of German armed forces. On the contrary, French generals 
were very well informed of the realities of German power before both World Wars. The 
problem for France was that intelligence became a threat, because it confronted France 
with the realities of her own weakness. Currently, intelligence services all over the world 
are flashing warning signals about some threats to the nations’ security.  
                                                 
11 Douglas Porch. French Intelligence Culture: A Historical and Political Prospective. 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 3. Frank Cass, London, 1995. P. 491. 
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In sum the intelligence agencies should focus on their main mission: safeguarding 
the security of their people by providing accurate, objective and clear information to 
policy makers.12 
 
E.  THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 
To understand the role of security intelligence under authoritarian as well as under 
democratic regimes, one must understand two variables, completed democratic 
transitions and consolidated democracies.   
Democratic transitions or democratization entails liberalization. This may entail a 
mix of policies and social changes, such as opposing media censorship, political 
organizations, legal safeguards for individuals, such as habeas corpus, the release of most 
political prisoners, the return of exiles, improving the distribution of income, and most 
important, tolerance. In addition, democratization requires free and open political 
campaigning and elections. 
However, in most cases after a democratic transition has been completed, many 
tasks must be accomplished. The critical modifications listed above, mainly social and 
economic changes, and tolerance must be established, and new attitudes and habits must 
also be cultivated before a democracy can be considered consolidated.  
According to Diamond, a consolidated democracy is a political situation where 
democracy has become “the only game in town.” Diamond identifies three dimensions in 
which changes occur: behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional. By applying these three 
                                                 
12 Snider Britt. “Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence.” February 
1997.  
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dimensions to an intelligence system of an authoritarian as well as to a democratic 
regime, this thesis compares both regimes and describes the new role of an intelligence 
system in new democracies.  
Although Diamond identifies the three dimensions of “behaviorally, attitudinally 
and constitutionally,” Peter Gill expands this concept by including three other elements: 
“mandate, structure and oversight.” Peter Gill further argues that one must identify any 
possible internal or external threats to national security or public order. Furthermore, he 
argues one must consider the issue of constitutionally, which is inherent in mandate, 
structure, and oversight.13  
 
1.  Under an Authoritarian Regime  
To understand intelligence under an authoritarian regime, one must define the 
expression “authoritarian regime.” According to Linz and Stepan, such a regime is a 
“political system … without an elaborate and guiding ideology … in which a leader or 
occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits.” Linz and 
Stepan describe such a system as politically restrictive, irresponsible to both the needs of 
the citizens and the nation at large, yet catering to the self-serving desires of despotic or 
autocratic leaders. These regimes and the intelligence systems that serve them frequently 
                                                 
13 Peter Gill. Policing Politics. Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State. Frank 
Cass & CO. LTD. London, England, 1994. P. 317.  
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dismiss the inalienable rights of the citizens, ignore the common standards of justice, and 
flagrantly abuse human rights.14 
We can easily catalogue the characteristics of such regimes by employing 
Diamond’s three dimensions of a consolidated democracy as a benchmark. In doing so, 
we clearly see the inadequacies and dangers inherent in autocracies. Based on Diamond’s 
three dimensions, behavio rally, attitudinally, and constitutionally, let’s examine 
authoritarian regimes in the next three sections:  
       
a. Behaviorally 
 Viewed from this dimension, national, social, economic, political, or 
institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their biased 
objectives by creating a non-democratic regime, or turning to violence or foreign 
intervention to secede from the state. In such cases, the legal system is inefficient and 
highly politicized. Those flawed systems allow political, economic, social, or military 
groups to avoid punishments when they have the power to dominate the government and 
to perpetrate abuses.  
 The military, which is in charge of the intelligence operations, perpetrates 
many crimes against society. Little can be done to halt such powers. Moreover, heavy 
influence over political appointees allows the perpetrators to escape with impunity, for 
they have little fear of the law capturing and judging them.   
                                                 
14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidations: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996. 
P.38.   
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 In this dimension, civilian control of the military may not exist. Any 
control may merely benefit the authoritarian government. Intelligence services are used to 
gather information to maintain the existing status quo. Such governments are violating 
human rights and abusing power. To cite an example, the Argentina military government, 
which ruled from 1976 to 1983, was known and feared for its practices, called 




 Most people believe those authoritarian procedures and institutions oppose 
or undermine civil and human rights. They also believe that civil society, fearing the 
state, cannot combat the injustices. However, in several cases (El Salvador, Romania) 
citizens wearied of this situation and revolted. In the case of El Salvador, political 
violence by both sectors ensued, creating a civil war that lasted more than twelve years 
(1979-1992).  
 During authoritarian regimes, the existing governments had to rely on 
organizations, such as intelligence, to identify their domestic opponents, to neutralize 
their opposition to the government, and to control the media in hopes of manipulating the 
nation by instilling public apathy and complacency. According to Bruneau, precisely 
because of this heavy reliance and its centrality to power, the intelligence apparatus 
                                                 
15 Cynthia J. Arnson. Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. Stanford University Press, 
California, 1999.   
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increased in size and power until that they were largely autonomous, even with 
authoritarian regimes.16  
 
c. Constitutionally 
 Generally, intelligence authorities under authoritarian regimes have no 
respect for the rule of law. They often impose their own rules and procedures, denying 
accountability, transparency, and human rights. Under such regimes, a system of checks 
and balances doesn’t exist. The intelligence services perform their activities secretly and 
without any kind of accountability.  
 In this dimension, the military rarely, if ever, provides the legislature with 
information about military expenditures, plans, or military operations. The military 
considers this classified national security information. Therefore, only a few people know 
exactly what the military is doing, and what resources are available to them. 
 Within the constitutionally dimension, there exist three elements that 
together define the rule of law, on which the intelligence services base its role and its 
activities: mandate, structure and oversight. Now we can examine each of these three 
terms:     
(1) Mandate 
 In an authoritarian regime as well as in a democratic one, the 
intelligence services exist principally to serve the needs of the executive authority. The 
primary difference between the authoritarian and democratic regimes is that the 
                                                 
16 Thomas C. Bruneau. “Intelligence in New Democracies: The Challenge of Civilian Control.” 
The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. July 1999. P. 2.   
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authoritarian serves the interests of a person or of a small group in power, ignoring the 
nation’s needs. On the other hand, the democratic regime serves the general interests of 
the population.  
Under an authoritarian regime a clear mandate that forbids abuse 
of power and violations of human rights does not exist. Policy makers are far from 
respecting human and civil rights. For instance, under Pinochet’s regime in Chile, 
political leaders were kidnapped by the intelligence service. The DINA, the secret police 
active during this regime, committed systematic “disappearances.” One famous crime 
was the 1976 assassination in Washington, DC, of Orlando Letelier, a former cabinet 
minister of the Allende government and an American colleague of Letelier.         
(2) Structure  
 Even though intelligence in an authoritarian regime can be divided 
into external and internal, the control is in the hands of a person or of a small group, 
mainly supported by the military, allowing an abuse of power and violations of human 
rights. As such, the military controls both external and internal security and would never 
consider recognizing the civilian police or even, consider using civilian police forces to 
support their job under the control of military intelligence, or sharing intelligence 
activities. 
(3)  Oversight 
 Under an authoritarian regime, oversight of intelligence activities 
and their expenditures rarely exists. Characterized by the lack of transparency, every 
action is executed in secrecy, avoiding accountability and the checks and balances of the 
state. The authorities are always favored whether justly or unjustly.  
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2.  Under a Democratic Regime  
Reformulating Robert Dahl’s definition of Polyarchy, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin 
Lipset, and Larry Diamond define democracy as follows: “A Democratic regime is a 
system of government that meets three essential conditions. Meaningful and extensive 
competition among individuals, and groups (especially political parties) for all effective 
positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. 
Highly inclusive levels of political participation in the election of leaders and policies, at 
least through regular and fair elections, with no major (adult) social group being 
excluded. Lastly, a level of civil and political liberties-freedom of expression, freedom of 
the press, freedom to form and join organizations-sufficient to ensure the integrity of 
political competition and participation.”17 
Regarding the three dimensions and focusing on the intelligence system, 
under this regime, these dimensions could be defined as follows: 
 
a. Behaviorally 
Behaviorally, democracy exists when no significant political groups 
seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or attempt to secede from the state; 
and when the intelligence system is used democratically to gather information respecting 
human and civil rights. A democratic regime is consolidated when no significant national, 
social, economic, political, or institutional groups spend significant resources of time or 
money attempting to achieve self-devoted objectives by creating a non-democratic 
                                                 
17 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Eds. Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, 1989. P. xvi. 
 23
regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state. The 
intelligence system allows the strengthening of civil-military relations by giving the 
civilians the opportunity to join it and to learn about it.18      
 
b. Attitudinally 
Attitudinally, true democracy exists when, even in the face of severe 
political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any 
further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic 
principles. A democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion 
believes that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to 
govern collective life in a society, and when the support for anti-system alternatives is 
quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. In such a system, the 
intelligence community has as its main objective the safeguarding of the nation under the 
rule of law and its application for every citizen. 19  
 
c. Constitutionally 
 Constitutionally, a democracy exists when all the actors in the polity 
believe political conflicts will be resolved according to the established norms, and that 
violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. A democratic 
regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike, 
                                                 
18 Ibid., xvi.    
19 Ibid., xvi. 
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throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to and habituated to resolving 
conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.20   
(1) Mandate  
In new democracies a legal mandate for intelligence systems is a 
necessary condition for several reasons, such as ensuring an organization's effectiveness, 
encouraging self-restraint and providing oversight.21 
Mandate is the first stage of structuring an intelligence 
organization. Undeniably, the intelligence service exists principally to serve the needs of 
the executive authority. The service also makes a large part of its output available to the 
legislative branch or congress. A “legal security mandate” assigns these responsibilities 
to the intelligence service in order to establish a state’s security. This mandate must be 
based on permanent and legal objectives. After identifying any threats to a permanent 
objective, a legal mandate can be assigned. A clear mandate, legally based, minimizes the 
risks of abuse and also allows politicians to optimize resources.  
A clear and comprehensive legal framework, such as a legal 
mandate brings intelligence under control and a benevolent structure can be organized. 
(2) Structure 
Regarding structure, "intelligence" is linked primarily to foreign 
relations, national defense, and internal security. Depending on the location of 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 Peter Gill. Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State. Frank 
Cass & CO. LTD. London, England, 1994. P. 127. 
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intelligence within the state structure, the three functions differ in purposes and 
specialization. Each function dictates different rules and procedures. Thus intelligence 
can be divided into two main categories: external intelligence (or strategic intelligence), 
known as foreign intelligence, and internal intelligence (or police intelligence), known as 
domestic intelligence.22 
In new democracies, the external is a military function under 
civilian control, with the main goal of defending and protecting the sovereignty and the 
integrity of the territory. The external can be divided into three branches: the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. The internal is understood as a civilian function in which the 
military is not allowed to intervene. The internal consist of political and criminal 
intelligence, depending on the threat it faces. Because of the new threats, such as drug 
trafficking, organized crime, nowadays, the internal security requires new branches, 
which address these new threats. To structure an intelligence service, one must adopt 
permanent objectives and define the roles and functions of each segment of the service. 
                                   (3) Oversight 
Seeing democracy as a process, Alfred Stepan offers the following 
definition: “Democratization requires the open contestation for the right to win control of 
the government, and in turn requires free elections. Democratization entails liberalization 
but it is a wider and more specifically political concept.”23 As implied in this definition, 
                                                 
22 Eduardo E. Estevez. “Modelos de Inteligencia, Estructuras y su Aplicacion en Policias en 
Proceso de Reforma.” Document presented during the Seminar in Police Intelligence, Instituto de 
Ensenanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES), Guatemala, July 1999. P. 7. 
23 Alfred  Stepan. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998.  
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democracy means something more than mere elections; it also implies oversight and 
control of the state apparatus. Therefore, civilian control and oversight of the intelligence 
apparatus is a crucial aspect to be considered for any country becoming a consolidated 
democracy. 
In new democracies establishing oversight of the intelligence 
systems is a big challenge mainly because secrecy is still required and, as Pat Holt states, 
"Secrecy is the enemy of democracy."24 Secrecy encourages abuse, illegality, and 
eschews accountability, the most important mechanism of democracy. However, in order 
to reach a balance between security, intelligence activities, individual liberties, and to 
avoid past abuses of authoritarian regimes, the issue of oversight has recently dominated 
the control of intelligence functions. Thus, presently in democracies with presidential 
systems, oversight includes the legislative as well as the executive branch and even the 
judicial. 25 The oversight of the legislative branch is performed as follows:   
· The Legislative Branch or Congress conducts its oversight functions using 
different mechanisms. The principal function is the budget, and this mechanism gives the 
congress vast power over intelligence. The second mechanism entails Congress’ ability to 
confirm or reject nominations. Other mechanisms are treaties, which Congress can ratify. 
Finally, the Congress has the power to ask the intelligence community for information. 
This mechanism of control is known as hearings. Congress relates to the intelligence 
community in three primary ways: by annually providing funds for the intelligence 
                                                 
24 Cited by Thomas Bruneau in his essay: "Intelligence in New Democracies: The Challenge of 
Civilian Control," July 1999. P. 13.  
25 Mark M. Lowenthal. "The Intelligence Process Oversight and Accountability." In his book 
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press, Washington DC. 1999. P. 133.  
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budget, by performing oversight of intelligence, and by receiving and using 
intelligence.26 The most significant relation is oversight, which entails keeping track of 
how funds are spent and whether the activities of the executive branch are consistent with 
the law. Emily Francona, in an interview said, "Congress takes the place of the people," 
in other words congress must maintain oversight of all intelligence functions.27 
   Even though oversight is mainly performed by the Congress in a 
system of "checks and balances," both the executive and the judicial branch are involved 
in the following controls of intelligence:  
· Executive Branch: This branch focuses its oversight on issues related to 
espionage and covert actions. Only the president, as head of the executive branch, can 
authorize covert actions. No covert action can be conducted without the president's 
signature. The executive branch is also responsible for performing oversight for internal 
matters of the intelligence system. 
· Judicial Branch: The principal function of this branch is to assure the 
strict fulfillment of the law and its impartial application for everybody. Since the 
intelligence system is structured under the constitution of the state, the judicial branch 
oversees all the functions of intelligence. Policy makers must certify that the objectives of 
the intelligence community are in accordance with the nation’s law and constitution. 
                                                 
26 Snider Britt. “Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence.”  February 
1997. P. 61.  
27 Emily Francona, former member of the intelligence community of the United States Congress. 
Interview in Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000.  
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  This Chapter concludes that intelligence is a process of vital 
importance for the nations’ security. To be sure, intelligence is still required but it should 
be refocused. The characteristics found under an authoritarian intelligence system 
regarding to the three dimensions behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally must be 
changed. The new role and structure must be based on the characteristics found under a 
democratic intelligence system.  
Therefore it is important to change the role and structure of 
intelligence system from an authoritarian intelligence system to a democratic intelligence 
system. To do so, knowledge about some strategies useful to make these changes is 
necessary. The next Chapter examines these strategies for designing a new model, which 
reaches a balance between the security of the state, intelligence activities and respect of 











III. ESTABLISHING THE NEW ROLE OF SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: A WICKED PROBLEM 
TO BE SOLVED 
 
Getting started is half of the battle and beginning we all applaud.  
         -Plato 
 
This section investigates why establishing the new role of security intelligence is 
a wicked problem. This section also identifies some strategies that should be used to 
implement this change. Finally, this section identifies some mechanisms for evaluating 
and implementing changes.  
Chapter IV concerns intelligence systems under an authoritarian regime. During 
these periods of authoritative control, 28 the citizens were never stakeholders; as a result 
changes were impossible. Chapter V involves intelligence systems under democratic 
regimes and the strategies Argentina and Romania used to make their changes. This 
Chapter reveals why the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime has been 
labeled a “wicked” problem.  
As previously pointed out, some of the principal concerns of this thesis are who 
should possess the highest authority of intelligence? Should it be the president, the state, 
the Security Council, congress, or other branches? How can oversight and transparency 
be established without jeopardizing national security or the effectiveness of intelligence? 
What strategy should be used to deal with this wicked problem?   
                                                 
28 Authoritative control is the power to make all important decisions and to impose them upon the 
population by the use of force, such control resides in an individual or in a sector of the society, which 
governs the country socially, politically, economically and militarily.   
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Since the Departments of Defense commonly have always paid great attention to 
what they call, “command and control” of the nation’s military and since, unfortunately, 
similar attention has not been given (at times deliberately) to the command and control of 
intelligence, can or should this be changed?   
Many problems appear to be tame, easy to control, but are not. Confusion and 
disagreement among the stakeholders indicate that the problem is wicked. Sometimes the 
government persists in applying inadequate analysis and solutions. One reason for these 
inadequacies is that taming a wicked problem, with the proper strategy, is actually 
achievable. Conklin and Wel state, "To do so, you (a government) simply construct a 
problem definition that obscures the wicked nature of the problem and then apply linear 
methods to solving it."29 
 
A.  WHY IS IT A WICKED PROBLEM? 
Defining new roles for security intelligence for new democracies, which were 
formerly authoritarian regimes, is clearly a challenging and laborious task, or what one 
could call a “wicked” problem. A wicked problem meets the following criteria:30 
1) In a democracy, in regard to political issues, all citizens have the right to 
become stakeholders and the majority of those citizens are not taken into account. Such a 
quantity of stakeholders makes the problem-solving process fundamentally social. 
                                                 
29 E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil. Wicked Problems: Naming the Pain in Organizations. 
Group Decisions Support Systems, Washington D.C., 1999. P.6  
30 Ibid.  
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Getting the right answer is not as important as having stakeholders accept whatever 
solution emerges, namely, accepting the military’s or the politician’s solution. 
2) The solution constrained by limited resources and political leaderships 
change over time. In political issues as this one, operationally leadership can change 
because many new stakeholders generate different concepts. These stakeholders may 
come and go, change their minds, fail to communicate clearly, or change the rules by 
which the problems must be solved.  
3) Since the government could try to obscure the wicked nature of the 
problem, identifying a definitive problem and a definitive solution becomes difficult. The 
problem-solving process ends when time, money, or energy is exhausted, not when the 
perfect solution emerges. 
4) The problem is an evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints. 
Indeed there is no definitive statement of the problem. Nobody understands the problem 
until somebody develops a solution. 
Obviously, this criteria for a wicked problem reveals deep complexities given that 
a wicked problem is an evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints, a linear 
approach to solving such a problem simply will not work. Opportunity-driven problem 
solving allows for the natural and spontaneous flow of attention by an individual or 
group. The problem solvers permit sudden changes of topics or focus, welcome new 
insights, regardless of whether they appear to pertain to the problem or the solution, and 




B.  THE STAKEHOLDERS 
"Stakeholders include those individuals, groups, and other organizations who 
have an interest in the actions of an organization and who have the ability to influence 
it."31 Looking at this definition, in a democratic regime, everybody should be considered 
a stakeholder. Also all political decisions require a consensus from a plurality of key 
stakeholders about what should be done and how these responses should be done.     
With the concept of national security in new democracies, security is the 
responsibility of every citizen. So ideally, even though intelligence could be considered 
an exclusive government responsibility, now it is everybody's responsibility. Therefore to 
establish a new role should be an open activity involving all citizens, with the execution 
of the intelligence activities left to the persons legally appointed.  
 
1. Who are the Stakeholders?  
To be more specific, the stakeholders can be divided into two different levels, 
primary and secondary. Primary, stakeholders are those who have formal, official, or 
contractual relationships and have a direct and necessary impact upon the issue  in 
discussion. In this case, one could recognize the government’s executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, the military institutions, and the political parties. Secondary, 
stakeholders are those who are not directly engaged in the organization's activities but are 
able to exert influence or who are affected by the decisions taken. Civil society, non-
governmental organizations, and social groups fall within this level. 
                                                 
31 Grant T. Savage, Timothy W. Nix, Carlton J. Whitehead, and John D. Blair. Strategies for 
Assessing and Managing Organizational Stakeholders. Texas Tech University, 1999. P. 61.  
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Even though all citizens should be considered, one must evaluate two important 
factors: their potential to threaten the organization and their potential to cooperate with it. 
The stakeholder's capacity, opportunity, and willingness to threaten or to cooperate must 
be considered. Also one should realize that, the mixture of potential threat and of 
potential cooperation may best be managed through collaboration. 
 
2. What are their Stakes? 
In all democracies the stakes to reach national and international security are 
defined in the Constitution of the country. Since intelligence integrates and involves a 
nation's political, economic, social and military components, intelligence is an important 
factor for achieving national security. 
In regard to intelligence itself, the stakes of the primary stakeholders are: 
· The Executive Branch: to execute the law and functions legally established 
by the Legislative.   
· The Legislative Branch: to oversee intelligence through different 
mechanisms, such as budget and oversight.  
· The Judicial Branch: to assure the fulfillment of the law and to punish 
violators. 
· The Military Institutions: to assure the security of the state through the 
employment and training of the armed forces. 
· The Political Parties: to create a balance of power and to protect and 
promote democracy 
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The stakes of the secondary stakeholders might involve establishing a new role 
and designing a new model. 
 
C.  STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH THIS WICKED PROBLEM 
When a conflict arises over how to define a problem or how to reach a solution, 
coping strategies help problem solvers deal with the wicked problem. According to Dr. 
Nancy Roberts in her study, Coping with Wicked Problems, three generic strategies can 
be used to cope with these problems, Authoritative, Competitive, and Collaborative.32 
 
1. Authoritative Strategy 
This strategy transfers the problem to someone or some group who assumes the 
problem-solving process while others agree to abide by their decisions. It has advantages 
in coping with wicked problems, such as reducing the numbers of stakeholders and 
decreases the complexity of the problem-solving process. Relying on experts can make 
problem-solving more professional and objective. 
This strategy also has some disadvantages. First, authorities and experts can be 
wrong about the problem and about the solution. Another disadvantage is the lost 
opportunity for learning. If problem solving is left to experts, especially in a democratic 
society, then citizens can become further and further distanced from the important issues 
                                                 
32 Nancy Roberts. “Coping with Wicked Problems.” Paper to be presented to the Third BI-Annual 
Research Conference of the International Public Management Network, Sydney, Australia, March 4-6, 
2000. Naval Postgraduate School, February 15, 2000. P. 7, 12-13 
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of their time. A democracy rests on an informed citizenry, and it is not clear how 
authoritative strategies keep them informed and engaged in the governing process.33  
 
2. Competitive Strategy 
Stakeholders following this strategy assume a zero-sum game. Central to the 
pursuit of competitive strategies to deal with wicked problems is the search for power. 
Power, after all, is the ability to get what one wants against resistance. In a democracy 
this strategy could be dangerous because when a player wins out over the competition 
and can sustain its hold on power, then the power is concentrated in the player’s hands. 
Concentration of power enables the player to resort to authoritative strategies instead of 
dissipating resources in the competitive fray.  
One disadvantage of this strategy is that its use can provoke violence and warfare. 
Another disadvantage is the delay in decisions. The stalemates and gridlock that occur 
when stakeholders have enough power to block one another but not enough power to get 
something done, keeps important problems from getting accomplished.34 
 
3. Collaborative Strategy 
Rather than play a zero-sum game, collaboration is a win-win view of problem 
solving. Collaboration allows parties to accomplish more as a collective that they can 
achieve independently. Its advantages are numerous and evident. It allows the parties to 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 7, 12-13 
34 Ibid., p. 7.  
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share the costs and benefits of developing expensive technology rather than carrying the 
full risks on their own. Redundancies are eliminated and the organizations are efficient.   
Some disadvantages are increasing transaction costs, more meetings, more people 
with whom to communicate and to reach agreements, interactions that can take a great 
deal of effort and time. In applying this strategy, one must be aware that the dialogue 
doesn’t turn into debate and the debate into a protracted conflict.35 
 
D.  COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY THE MOST APPROPRIATE ONE 
At first glance, one could easily assume an authoritative strategy is best because 
the problem-solving process can be quicker and less contentious with fewer people 
involved. This is the basis of democracy. Ins tead of being directed involved, people elect 
representatives to govern, 
On the other hand, a competitive strategy can end in a concentration of power that 
opposes all democratic principles, so to create a new role and to design a new model a 
collaborative strategy seems to be most appropriate.   
         
1. Criteria for Selection 
Today, to face and to solve security issues, we need a collaborative and 
democratic strategy. We should not rely on an elite group of leaders for all the answers. 
Together people can take risks and turn the impossible into a win-win solution for 
everybody. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., pp. 7, 12, 13 
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Creative solutions require seeing problems from outside our own perspective. We 
need to redesign our problem-solving process to include the different parties that have a 
stake in the issue. Whoever generates new and useful ideas should receive our attention. 
Thus, integrating all these ideas, joining forces, sharing information and feelings, in other 
words, creating a collaborative strategy can provide solutions.   
One of the criteria used to select this strategy is its process, which is very clear 
and provides better solutions. According to Barbara Gray, this process involves the 
following steps:36 
1. Phase 1: The goal of problem setting is that the stakeholders agree to talk 
about the issues. 
2. Phase 2: The goal of direction setting is the negotiating between the 
stakeholders. 
3. Phase 3: The goal of implementation is the systematic management of 
inter-organizational relations. 
This process allows different types of collaboration. For example, “appreciative 
planning” involves exchanging information in the interest of advancing a shared vision. 
“Dialogues” create a forum for exploring solutions to a multiparty conflict. “Collective 
strategies” involve agreeing on how to implement a shared vision. “Negotiated 
settlements” represent solutions to conflicts among the stakeholders. 
                                                 
36 Barbara Gray. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. Jossey-Bass 
Publisher, San Francisco, 1991. P. 57.  
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The pitfalls of not collaborating includes repetition of efforts, omission of 
important data, divergence of opinions, all of this is counter-productive and often creates 
an inability to compete with the opposition. 
 
E.  IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
As the challenges of global competition demands improved quality organizations 
find themselves under intense pressure to become more competitive. They must learn 
how to change rapidly in order to survive in a turbulent environment. And as 
organizations shift from a traditional hierarchy structure to a more flexible and 
participative networking style, leaders need a decision-making process that will foster the 
involvement and commitment of all their people and align them to common goals. 
Nowadays leaders and managers want speed and faster responses to solve problems. 
They want action and they want it now. They also want new ideas from the people and 
social technology. 37   
Thus in order to implement the process of how to define the new role of 
intelligence and the design of the new model, if necessary, using the method named Real 
Time Strategic Change (RTSC) could be useful to reach a better output as well as a better 
outcome. This method has some characteristics that make it a valuable tool to resolve 
complex issues not only by empowering stakeholders but also guaranteeing a more 
thorough and satisfactory solution. These characteristics are: 
                                                 
37 Barbara Benedict Bunker and Billie T. Alban. Large Group Interventions. Engaging the Whole 
System for Rapid Change. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1997. P. 61. 
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· Size: Although there are some other participative methods, the creators of 
the RTSC had a fundamental commitment to democracy that pervades their work. Most 
specifically, they had an optimistic view of human nature by which people are energized. 
People enjoy knowing more and having the opportunity to participate in setting their own 
destiny. 
· Degrees of Authority: The RTSC method allows those in authority to 
decide how much of their power and control they want to trust to others.  Thus, in RTSC, 
management accepts influence from others about the future strategic direction of the 
company. People have a voice in what needs to be improved and how to do it, but not in 
the overall direction of change. 
· Creating a Shared Framework: Before thinking strategically, one needs a 
common understanding of the situation. The max-mix group structure at round tables of 
eight is designed to bring people together with others outside of their normal contacts in 
the system. 
· The System-Wide Paradigm Shift: In the process of the first two days of 
working together, as the participants watch management respond and as they find their 
own voice, they feel more hopeful, energized, and excited about the possibility of a better 
future. When this happens to many people in the same place, the energy in the room 
changes noticeably and a paradigm shift occurs. This is really what empowerment is 
about. People feel that they are not pawns but actors affecting their own destiny. 38  
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 70.  
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Real Time Strategic Change is a flexible method used to design very large-scale 
events that create the future, redesign work, or deal with current decisions, problems and 
issues in the work system. 
 
F.  STRATEGY EVALUATION 
There are several ways to evaluate a strategy used to solve a wicked problem, for 
example, checking the problem solution or goal achievement, generating social capital, 
creating shared meanings, changing network structures, shifting the power distribution or 
the types of collaboration or the process of collaboration. To discuss any of these, it is 
important to review the following steps:    
First, to bring up again the output as well as the outcome expected: 
· Output: Creation of the new role of intelligence and design of a new 
model 
· Outcome: 1) Balance between the security and intelligence activities and 
the individual liberties. 2) Creation of shared meaning. 3) Changes in 
network structure. 4) Shifts in power distribution. 5) Sustainability. 
Second, to establish some questions helpful for judging the success of 
collaboration: 
· Does the outcome satisfy the real issues in dispute? 
· Do the parties feel they affected the decision? 
· Are the stakeholders willing and able to implement the decision? 
· Does the agreement produce joint gains for the parties? 
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· Were communications between the parties increased and the working 
relationships improved? 
· Has the agreement held up over time? 
· Was the process efficient in terms of time and resources? 
· Does the solution conform to available objective standards? 
· Do the parties perceive the procedures were fair? 
Concerning a political issue, one useful way to evaluate the success or failure is 
by reviewing the Changes in the Institutional Domain. This evaluation considers, among 
other factors, Generation of Social Capital, its principal indicator for evaluation is the 
presence of or the increase in trust and norms of reciprocity among the stakeholders. 
Another indicator is constructing shared norms, or sharing common interpretations of the 
problem domain and the actions that should be taken with respect to it.  
In regard to reviewing the process, if a preliminary diagnosis suggests that 
collaboration is possible, careful attention should be given to both member and process 
factors. “Member Factors” refers to the inclusion of all affected stakeholders and 
sufficient stakeholder incentives. On the other hand, “Process Factors” takes into account 
the agreement on the scope of the collaboration, and the ripeness of issues. It also 
considers timing, negotiating in good faith, and maintaining good relationships with 
constituents. 
Within this framework, the analysis of the strategies used by Argent ina and 
Romania in their changes from an authoritarian intelligence system to a democratic 
intelligence system and their results will be useful to suggest a strategy for performing 
the changes in new democracies, or democracies in transitions.  
 42
For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of the strategies will be focused on the 
results in generating social capital, creating shared meanings, changing network 










































IV. CASE STUDIES: INTELLIGENCE UNDER AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 
 
 This Chapter examines the similarities of abuses committed by intelligence 
services under bureaucratic authoritarian (Argentina and El Salvador), or totalitarian 
(Romania) regimes. Remarkably, the intelligence service abuses in the three countries 
were quite similar and intense, and interestingly, this intensity actually outraged the 
populations to such a point, it contributed to the improvements within the intelligence 
services. 
 However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an exhaustive description 
of the violations and consequences. Yet some relevant data detailing the suffering of 
Argentines, Romanians and Salvadorians illustrate a broad image of the magnitude of 
these abuses, stressing Diamond’s three dimensions, behaviorally, attitudinally and 
constitutionally.   
        
A.  ARGENTINA 
Recurring cycles of bloody rule have marked Argentina’s history. Historians date 
the modern military era from 1930, the year when Jose Felix Uriburu’s violent coup 
occurred. This was the first army take over since 1854. Between 1930 and 1976 there 
were nine civilian-backed military coups, two presidents appointed by the army, two 
clearly fraudulent and manipulated elections, and two terms of highly theatrical, quasi-
fascistic Peronism. The average life span of these administrations was 34 months; one 
government in 1943 lasted only two days; that president, Arturo Rawson, took the 
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Presidential House or Casa Rosada by force, but he was quickly replaced by another 
general. During this period, a good relation with the army was the key to staying in 
power. No president, civilian or military, has managed to stay in office against the wishes 
of the men in uniform.39 
In the 1960s, a series of coups occurred, and in the early 1970s, as unemployment 
increased and the peso decreased, guerrilla war broke out between armies of the ultra-
right and the ultra- left. Kidnappings, executions, and random violence made everyone 
vulnerable. The upper-middle class hired bodyguards and businesses paid both sides for 
protection. In the midst of this popular dissatisfaction, in July of 1974, Peron died and 
was succeeded by his widow, Isabel, who, in spite of her total political incompetence, had 
served as vice-president.  
Responding to threats from the militant left, the Peronist government organized 
death squads under the support of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, or the Triple 
A. Coordinated at first by the Federal Police, the Triple A was eventually taken over by 
Jose Lopez Rega, the Minister of Social Welfare who would come to be known as 
President Isabel Peron’s “Rasputin,” warlock (el brujo).40 During Isabel’s presidential 
period, in 1975, the “eradication” of “subversive elements” with the aid of the 
intelligence services was officially decreed, under decree No. 261. This decree also 
authorized the armed forces for nonmilitary, “psychological operations.” The country, 
though nominally democratic, was essentially occupied and under siege.                    
                                                 
39 Marguerite Feitlowitz. A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture. Oxford 
University Press 1998. P. 5. 
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The armed left had its roots in Peronism. The largest opposition group was the 
Montoneros, also active was the ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army) and two much 
smaller groups, the FAR (Revolutionary Armed Force) and FAP (People’s Armed Force). 
At their height in 1974-75, these leftist groups totaled no more than 2,000 individuals, of 
whom only 400 had access to arms. Both before and after the coup, the government 
grossly exaggerated the strength of the insurgent forces. Over the entire decade of the 
1970s, the leftist groups carried out a total of 697 assassinations, killing 400 policemen, 
143 members of the military, and 54 civilians, mostly industrialists.41     
In 1975, in what was both a gesture of support for the Triple A and a statement of 
his own political ambitions, General Rafael Videla, who became president in 1976, 
declared, “As many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will 
again be secure.” By the end of that year, the armed left had been routed but economic 
and political chaos ruled. Inflation had risen, export earnings had fallen and the deficit 
had reached a surprising one billion dollars.42  
During 1976, the country was exhausted, and more than anything else the people 
wanted law and order. So, on March 24, 1976, “Isabelita” was ousted in a coup called, 
“The Gentlemen’s Coup,” which virtually all Argentines welcomed, and General Videla 
became the de facto President. The generals were trying to reassure calm. This coup 
began what came to be called the “Dirty War.” General Videla arrived with a plan called 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 6.   




the “Process for National Reorganization” the language of which lent grandeur to an 
otherwise desperate moment. This was a fight not just for Argentina but the generals 
stressed, for “Western, Christian Civilization.” Argentina “would join the concert of 
nations” by eliminating subversion. 
Argentina was the theater of “World War III,” which had to be fought against 
those whose activities and thoughts were deemed “subversive.” Intellectuals, writers, 
journalists, trade unionists, psychologists, social workers became “categories of guilt.” 
Following the characteristics of an authoritarian regime, such as lack of civil rights, the 
junta promulgated one of its first laws. This law decreed that workers could be fired 
without cause and without any right to indemnification. Strikes were forbidden, and the 
bank accounts of the General Confederation of Labor were immediately seized. Labor 
unions, professional guilds, teacher’s associations, even student councils were 
specifically targeted in new laws published on the front page of every major daily.43  
The junta was particularly obsessed with the hidden enemy. Suspects were 
“disappeared” in order to be exposed and most of the time, annihilated. There existed a 
network of some 340 secret torture centers and concentration camps. “The only way to 
identify this occult enemy is through information obtained through torture. And for 
torture to be effective, they’d tell us, it has to be limitless…” So testified Martin Gras, a 
lawyer who was imprisoned in an Argentine concentration camp for two years.44 
                                                 
43 Marguerite Feitlowitz. A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture. Oxford 
University Press 1998. P. 7. 
44 Ibid., p. 8. 
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A succession of four juntas from 1976 to 1983 composed of three senior officers, 
one each from the army, navy, and air force headed this regime. The first and most 
repressive junta consisted of President General Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Eduardo 
Massera, and Brigadier General Orlando R. Agosti. In 1981 General Roberto Viola, 
Army Chief of Staff, succeeded Videla. Viola was a pragmatist who saw that the regime 
couldn’t last forever and attempted to open talks with representatives of the political 
parties, though these were still illegal. Viola was unseated in late 1981 by the even more 
reactionary General Leopoldo Galtieri. 
In 1982, General Reynaldo Bignore was appointed to preside over a “dignified” 
end to the process and to orchestrate the transition to free elections. Even though the 
juntas attempted to project the image of “impersonal” and “unified” military rule, each 
one was characterized by intense internal rivalry. This situation generated problems 
among the different military intelligence services. 
Six years after the Dirty War coup, the regime was eventually brought down, but 
not because of its records in human rights. Rather it crumbled under the weight of its own 
corruption, economic mismanagement, and military incompetence. In April 1982, in a 
desperate attempt to distract the population and rescue its image, the junta went to war 
against the British for the tiny Falkland Islands (Las Malvinas) in the South Atlantic. The 
invasion was in every way a fiasco, and the defeat in every way humiliating. For the 
dictatorship, it spelled the end. On April 28, 1983, as it prepared to exit from power, the 
regime issued a Final Report, proclaiming victory in its Dirty War against subversion, 
pardoning itself for any possible “excesses,” and registering “genuine Christian pain over 
any errors that might have been committed in the fulfillment of the assigned mission.”   
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The most brutal years were 1976-79. The majority of the disappearances 
happened then, mainly during the 1976-77s. The kidnappings did not stop until near the 
end of the dictatorship in 1983, and it is known that even after the election of Dr. Raul 
Alfonsin, a small number of individuals were still being held in military camps. 
                                              
1. Behaviorally 
In his first address to the nation, Videla stressed the theme of “subordination,” 
which he said, “is not submission, nor blind obedience to capricious orders. To be 
subordinate means to consciously obey in order to achieve a higher objective…One 
historical cycle has ended,” Videla proclaimed, “another one begins.”45  
In this new epoch, all citizens were called to battle. “Your weapons are your eyes, 
your ears, and your intuition. Use them to exercise your right to familial and social 
defense,” said a communiqué issued to the public by the Fifth Army Corps. “Defense is 
not only military, but [a matter for] all who want a prosperous country with a future…. 
citizens, assume your obligations as Reserve Soldiers. Your information is always useful. 
Bring it to us.”46  
In accordance with this lecture, Argentines were expected to denounce individuals 
whose appearance, actions, or presence seemed “inappropriate.” The Junta emphasized, 
“The enemy has no flag nor uniform…nor even a face. Only the enemy knows that he is 
                                                 
45 Videla’s speech, copy from La Prensa, March 27, 1976 by Marguerite Feitlowitz in her book: A 
Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture. Oxford University Press, 1998. P. 23.  
46 La Nacion, March 29, 1976. Cited by Marguerite Feitlowitz in her book: A Lexicon of Terror: 
Argentina and the Legacies of Torture. Oxford University Press 1998. P. 23.   
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the enemy.”47 In a front-page article in La Prensa, the regime warned: “The people must 
learn to recognize the ‘civilized’ man who does not know how to live in society and who 
in spite of his appearance and behavior harbors atheist attitudes that leave no space for 
God.”48 Using Mao’s famous phrase, the Argentine generals held that “the guerrilla must 
not be allowed to circulate like fish in water.”                        
 “You may know everything, but we control it all” was another expression used 
by the Junta in order to create more terror and fear in the population. Policies and 
practices of repression, terror, and colonization or destruction of civil society comprised 
the basic behavior of the Junta. No expression so infuriated them as “human rights.”49  
   
2. Attitudinally 
The Dirty War occurred, at least in part, because Argentines were too terrorized to 
look each other in the face. The tentacles of the intelligence apparatus could penetrate 
into every area of Argentine society. Based on a philosophy of exterminating the enemy, 
the system of disappearances, kidnappings, assassinations, legal and clandestine 
imprisonments and tortures, organized systematically with deliberation and cruelty, 
unsettled Argentine society, traumatizing it to the point of exhaustion and conformity.      
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University Press 1998. 
 50
“Silence is health,” numerous Argentines recall was a slogan of that time. 
“Health” came to mean “proper social adaptation,” that is, conformity, passivity, 
compliance, which were masked with grander words like faith, cooperation, personal 
responsibility, and maturity. 
People were terrorized by the regime, for they could be found guilty just for 
helping others. For example, Daniel Bendersky was kidnapped on September 16, 1978. 
His so-called crime was collecting money for the “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” an 
Argentine group of mothers who had relatives kidnapped by the intelligence services. 
“They had so many ways,” said his father, “of erasing people, of trying to make you 
doubt the truth of your own life.”50      
 
3. Constitutionally 
The Argentine intelligence apparatus under this regime was a clear example of the 
lack of the rule of law, accountability, transparency, and respect of human rights. As 
Marcos Aguini, an Argentine novelist said, “Remember, this is a country where even the 
non-Jews know they have no rights. Ask anybody on the street, and he will tell you, there 
is one law for us, and one law for them. Nobody even expects justice here, and it is easier 
to forget.”51       
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. , p. 29.  




 The intelligence apparatus as well as the rest of the government were 
indoctrinated with brutal, sadistic, and rapacious perspectives such as the following one: 
“…No more words, only defeat and annihilation.” For those who needed a literal 
translation, there was the unsurprisingly explicit Iberico Saint Jean, governor of the 
Province of Buenos Aires: “First we will kill all the subversives; then we will kill their 
collaborators; then…their sympathizers; then…those who remain indifferent; and finally 
we will kill the timid.”52 The completely unrestrained audacity of this statement made it 
so hard to believe. Yet it was indeed the monstrous plan. 
 Many examples, such as the famous Death Flights, can be given of the 
strategies used to fulfill this inhuman plan. According to Adolfo Francisco Scilingo, who 
publicly admitted that while stationed at the Navy Mechanic School in 1977, he 
participated in two death flights, throwing a total of thirty living, but drugged, 
desaparecidos from navy airplanes into the Atlantic Ocean. Among them were a sixty-
five-year-old man, a sixteen-year-old boy, and two pregnant women in their early 
twenties. He calculated that during his two years at the ESMA (1976-1977), “a hundred 
Wednesdays, between 1,500 and 2000 people” were thrown into the sea.53  
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b. Structure 
 Before 1946, there were intelligence organizations in each military branch 
working on strategic intelligence as well as on internal and external political intelligence. 
 After 1946, by decree, President Peron created the first civil intelligence 
organization: Coordination for Information of the Presidency, which answered directly to 
him. Its mission was to provide the executive branch with useful information, and to 
centralize and to coordinate intelligence coming from military services or governmental 
agencies. It was highly developed and competitive, while military intelligence remained 
focused specifically on military issues, but the military intelligence organizations still 
controlled both internal and external intelligence.54    
The civilian Secretaria de Inteligencia de Estado (SIDE) never fulfilled its 
legally established responsibilities. During the different military regimes of this period, 
active-duty military personnel still occupied the most important positions in civilian 
intelligence organizations. 
In 1961, the civilian President Frondizi ordered the SIDE to play the 
senior intelligence agency role. Its mission was to plan, direct, and oversee state actions 
against communism and other extremist threats. Its tasks were unrelated to the military, 
internal security, and judicial matters. The Secretary of SIDE had cabinet-level authority, 
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and again answered to the President. Subsequent military regimes frustrated these 
attempts to “civilianize” the intelligence apparatus.55 
 In 1971, President (Army General) Lanusse replaced the SIDE, as the 
senior intelligence agency, with the Central Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), which he 
controlled directly. It was responsible for centralizing the intelligence activities necessary 
for the national security policymaker process. However, it was directed by a Junta (an 
intelligence organization of the state, armed forces, and the federal police), under the 
leadership of a General officer of the armed forces, with cabinet- level authority. Its 
purpose was similar to the CIA, for coordinating activities within the intelligence 
community. 56 During 1973, the SIDA and CNI remained separate agencies under the 
unified control of the Secretary of the SIDE, who coordinated all intelligence activities. 
As before, many military members remained within the organization, with a General at 
the head. 
In combating what the military regimes considered internal enemies, the 
government focused on using the intelligence community for countering subversion. In 
reality, the intelligence agencies were the government’s primary tool for imposing a 
“terror regime” by means of a “dirty war,” which lasted many years despite the 
guerrillas’ defeat in 1978.  
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The following Figure 2 illustrates the structure of Argentine intelligence system 
under its authoritarian regimes. This figure has been designed by the author of this thesis, 









      
SIDE (Secretaria de Inteligencia de Estado)  
CNI (Central Nacional de Inteligencia)  
Figure 2. Argentine’s Intelligence under Authoritarian Regimes 
 
c. Oversight 
 Total control of the intelligence was under the military institutions, which 
were all immune from prosecution. The military never provided any other institution with 
information about their expenditures, their plans, their execution of operations, or the 
resources they used. They considered this classified national security information. 
 
 
PRE - 1946 
PRESIDENT  
NAVY AIR FORCE  ARMY 






  In sum, Argentina’s Intelligence Systems under its authoritarian regimes 
show all the typical characteristics of these services during authoritarian periods. 
Behaviorally, the heads of the intelligence services were military officers. Before assuring 
jobs, they were taught torture, murder, sabotage, bribery, blackmail, and extortion for the 
achievement of political aims; that hypnosis and truth serum were recommended for use in 
interrogations; and that the parents of captives be arrested as an inducement for the 
prisoner to talk. 
 Attitudinally, Argentines were so afraid that they couldn’t forge a strong 
civil society. They knew the intelligence services could control every area of their lives, 
so they even were afraid of their own family. Constitutionally, respect for the rule of law 
didn’t exist. The heads of the intelligence services were the only laws that existed. They 
were the laws unto themselves and they could control and destroy everything even their 
own society.      
 
 B.  ROMANIA 
Romania like other Eastern European communist countries witnessed a 
dictatorial/authoritarian regime for 50 years, in which a key role was played by the 
Ministry of Interior’s Department of State Security (Departamentul Securitatii Statului, 
popularly known as the Securitate).57  
The Ministry of Interior was the primary government organization responsible for 
maintaining order in Romania. Its functions ranged widely from identifying and 
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neutralizing foreign espionage and domestic political threats to the Ceausescu regime to 
supervising routine police work and local fire departments. The Ministry of Interior was 
organized into a number of directorates at the national level, and it controlled similar 
activities at the judet and municipal levels.58  
In prewar Romania, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the precursor of the Ministry 
of Interior) closely supervised the activities of local governments and courts. The PCR 
gained control of the ministry in 1946 and filled its ranks with party activists, enabling 
the party to seize power the next year and to consolidate communist rule during the 
following decade.59 
The Securitate was a very strong internal intelligence service within the Ministry 
of Interior. It was the Communist Party of Romania’s secret political police. This 
organization was meant to be secret, but an increasing number of people who withdrew 
from it shed some light on their composition and activities. The Securitate was 
responsible for guarding the internal security of the Ceausescu’s regime and suppressing 
any unrest, disturbance, or dissident group that criticized or challenged it.60  
Within the Securitate, collection was carried out by menacing, and oppressing 
people, violating their freedoms and rights. Then the raw information was transformed 
into intelligence for Ceausescu, the leader of the country. The Securitate was a privileged 
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caste, with people being carefully selected. It succeeded in repressing most organized 
opposition to the regime.  
Yet spontaneous outbursts of discontent with Ceausescu’s “cult of personality,” 
economic austerity policy, treatment of ethnic minorities, anti-religious campaign, and 
lack of respect for internationally recognized civil and human rights occurred with 




Terror and isolation from other civilizations62 were the instruments wielded by all 
the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe as the means of implementing the Marxist-
Leninist revolution. Romanians were physically and socially separated from the rest of 
the world. The country’s policy was to avo id all type of relationship with other countries 
to impede Romanians any contact with people living under different regimes.    
The destruction of Romanian existing society and the creation of a new one was 
achieved by a single mass party, composed of an elite and dedicated membership whose 
targets were central control and direction of the economy, a technologically perfected 
monopoly of the media and complete direction of the armed forces.  
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Police terror is an intrinsic feature of totalitarianism and communist rule, as has 
been confirmed in Romania. The task assigned to the police was to remove the enemies 
of the regime and those classes of the population that were considered an obstacle to the 
centralized running of the economy. This program was initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej after 
1945. It was the inheritance of Nicolae Ceausescu. 63 
Of all the crimes committed by the authorities in Romanian’s prisons under the 
Communist regime, the “re-education” program was more carefully shrouded in secrecy 
than any other was. The principal reason for this was that the very victims of reeducation 
were forced to become, in their turn, the executioners and naturally the executioner is 
reluctant to admit his crime. The experiment-employed techniques of psychiatric abuse 
designed not only to inculcate terror into opponents of the regime but also to destroy the 
personality of the individual. These techniques were based on what has been known as 
“The Hitler Syndrome” or disinformation exercise.64      
 
2. Attitudinally 
As with other machines of political terror, the Securitate’s most potent weapon 
was fear, and the depth of its inculcation into the Romanian population provided the 
principal reason for its success. Fear induces compliance and is therefore a tremendous 
device. Regarding the manpower of the Securitate, its number was far smaller. Records 
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indicate that in 1950, that is two years after its creation, the numbers of officers of all 
ranks in the General Directorate of People’s Security (DGSP), or Securitate totaled 
almost 5,000. In December 1989 this number had risen to 15,312, according to the 
records of the DSS. By adding the security troops command (Comandamentul Trupelor 
de Securitate), which numbered 23,370 officers and men and was responsible to the DSS, 
the total personne l in the DSS at the time of the 1989 Revolution was 38,682.65 
Conformity was another “characteristic” of Romanian society: “We live in a 
Socialist country and here the state maps out your life for you from birth. You are 
assigned a school, you are assigned a job, and you are assigned a place to live. 
Conformity is the rule, you do what you are told and if your expectations are limited and 
you don’t step out of the line, then you will be satisfied. And to make sure that you don’t 
step out of line they have the Securitate.”66      
     
3. Constitutionally 
Communist rule was marked by lies. No attention was paid to the Constitution. 
The parliament was side stepped and the government was conducted by presidential 
decree. Personal conduct was regulated by unpublished internal orders, which the 
authorities used to justify intervention in the public’s daily lives. The population craved 
transparency and truth in public life. Power rested on coercion and not on broad public 
support.     
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 During both periods of communist regimes, first under Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej and then under his successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, the intelligence services 
existed to serve the needs of the heads of the country.     
b. Structure 
 The Securitate comprised a large number of directorates, having 
specialized tasks, such as:67   
· The Directorate of Investigations had agents and informants placed in 
virtually every echelon of the party and government, as well as among the public, to 
report on the anti-regime activities and opinions of ordinary citizens. It committed illegal 
entries into public offices and private homes and interrogated and arrested people 
opposed to Ceausescu’s rule. Its agents frequently used force to make dissidents provide 
information on their compatriots and their activities. Its influence over judges and 
prosecutors resulted in the arrested dissidents. No dissident arrested by this directorate 
was ever acquitted in court. The Directorate of Investigations worked closely with the 
Directorate for Surveillance and the Directorate for Mail Censorship. It collected 
handwriting samples from the population and supervised the official registration of all 
typewriters and copying machines with the police.  
· The General Directorate for Technical Operations, established with the 
assistance of the KGB in the mid-1950s, monitored all voice and electronic 
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communications in the country. It intercepted all telephone, telegraph, and telex 
communications coming into and going out of the country. It secretly implanted 
microphones in public buildings and private residences to record conversations among 
ordinary citizens. 
· The Directorate for Counterespionage conducted surveillance against 
foreigners to monitor or to impede their contacts with Romanians. It enforced a variety of 
restrictions preventing foreigners from residing with ordinary citizens, keeping them 
from gaining access to foreign embassy compounds of requesting asylum, and requesting 
them to report any contact with foreigners to the Securitate within twenty-four hours. 
· The Directorate V and the Directorate for Internal Security focused mainly 
on party and government leadership cadres. Directorate V provided protective services 
and physical security for Romanian officials. The Directorate for Internal Security 
concentrated on rooting out disloyalty to Ceausescu within the PCR hierarchy, the 
Council of Ministers, and the Securitate itself. It was a small-version Securitate in itself, 
with independent surveillance, mail censorship, and telephone monitoring capabilities. 
· The Directorate IV was responsible for similar counterespionage functions 
within the armed forces. 
  The following diagram, Figure 3, shows the structure of the intelligence 
system of Romania under its totalitarian regime. This diagram has been designed by the 
author of this thesis, based on other diagrams and information from Romania’s Ministry 





Figure 3. Romania’s Intelligence under Authoritarian Regimes 
 
  c. Oversight 
 Not too much can be said about oversight during this period. This right of 
oversight the Securitate’s performances belonged to the heads of the country through the 
Ministry of Interior. Every action was executed in secrecy, lacking transparency and 





















































Being themselves the law, they were above the law. They were all-powerful and went 
unpunished.”68  
 According to some documents, the Securitate had not always acted solely 
under Draghici’s orders. No major decision was made in the early period of his tenure as 
the Ministry of Interior, without the approval of a Soviet counselor. But after Gheorghiu-
Dej’s rift with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, Draghichi became virtually a law unto 
himself.69      
 It is essential to mention that this organization was of such importance that 
just by removing Draghichi from being the Ministry of Interior, Ceausescu could 
consolidate his own position as General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. 
Then his prime objective was to have the Ministry of the Interior fully, initially under 
party control and ultimately under his own control. 70    
 In sum, the Romanian Intelligence Service or Securitate during the 
communist period played a key role in the internal security of Ceausescu’s regime. As in 
Argentina’s case, the Securitate was a clear example of this vital service to the nation 
under an authoritarian regime. Behaviorally, the Securitate used terror as its main 
instrument to implement the communist system. As Romanians problems multiplied, the 
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Ceausescus increasingly relied on the Securitate not only to act as a watchdog, but also to 
indulge in a variety of fund-raising activities.  
 Ceausescu’s background inclined him to believe in a conspiratorial theory 
of history. The Securitate fed this paranoia. It became, in the eyes of ordinary Romanians, 
an all-seeing, all-knowing, tentacular monster supervising every aspect of their day-to-
day lives. Attitudinally, Romania’s civil society couldn’t overcome its fear of the 
Securitate and it remained a weak and isolated society. Constitutionally, the Securitate 
was so strong that as control slipped from Ceausescu’s grasp, this intelligence apparatus 
became increasingly not just a repressive apparatus for keeping malcontents in lines, but 
a method of government. The Securitate might not have been able to remedy any of the 
economic problems, but it could at least enforce obedience.      
 
C.  EL SALVADOR 
Two powers, the oligarchy and the army, have historically stood behind the 
democratic façade that the constitutions of this country have traditionally erected. Since 
its independence in 1821, El Salvador was basically a republic controlled by an 
oligarchy, backed by the armed forces. Political competition has occurred among elite 
groups, while the armed forces have assumed the mission of repressing any disaffection 
on the part of the masses.71 
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After the 1932 revolution, the oligarchy made an alliance, or pact, with the armed 
forces, in which the military gained control over the government, and in exchange, the 
military agreed not to impede the enlargement of the oligarchy’s capital. 72 This pact was 
in place until 1979. In that year, a group of young military officers broke the pact with 
the oligarchy by carrying out the coup d’etat of 15 October that brought down the 
government of General Romero, the last military president.  
The military conspirators issued two proclamations; the first one described the 
rationale of the coup. According to this proclamation, Romero had been overthrown by 
the military institution for several reasons. He had persisted in using violence to resolve 
political problems, and he had allowed the public administration to become corrupt. The 
second proclamation indicated that the military was hoping to implement a reformist 
program. It proposed first to stop violence and corruption. Second, it promised to 
guarantee human rights, creating the climate for free elections, allowing the organization 
of political parties of all ideological stripes to strengthen the democratic system, granting 
political amnesty to all exiles and political detainees, and recognizing the right of labor to 
organize and promoting free speech. 73 
The proclamations issued by the military conspirators promised that the armed 
forces would establish the appropriate climate for real and dynamic democracy and 
would hold free elections trying to bring changes to the social and political life of El 
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Salvador. Yet it was too late for social and political changes, and a civil war started. 
During the civil war, the civilian government  lacked a strategic intelligence organization. 
The only strategic intelligence organization was controlled by the military. 
Even though the civil war started, these proclamations issued by the military 
conspirators in October 1979 have been considered a useful benchmark for the initial 
objectives of the Salvadoran transition process that began on 15 October 1979. 
 
1. Behaviorally 
In order to achieve and to maintain their objectives, the authoritarian governments 
used repressive tactics. For example, around 2,000 students in San Salvador organized a 
protest march. When it started out toward the Plaza Libertad, it was brutally repressed. 
There were 27 students killed and many disappeared, among them many women. One 
month after the students’ massacre, in August of 1975, a paramilitary organization called 
the Liberation Armed Forces of Anti-Communist Extermination War (FALANGE) 
published a series of menacing communiqués.74  
The death squads, coordinated by the military intelligence services, became the 
instruments of the state and the oligarchy in order to repress and eliminate political 
opposition. It is also important to mention that the government and the oligarchy also 
used the army, the security forces (intelligence), and the death squads to unleash a 
ferocious persecution against the church and people who were organized. Death threats, 
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raids and bombings of the archdiocesan radio and assassinations followed the defamatory 
campaigns of the government and right-wing media.             
 
2. Attitudinally 
Even with the fear of losing their lives, the citizens of El Salvador were strong 
and decided to fight against the government, the oligarchy, or the military to stop the 
repression and to secure their human and civil rights.  
In this framework, on March 23, 1980, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero made a 
vehement call to low-ranking soldiers of the army and to the security forces to disobey 
their superiors when ordered to fire on defenseless people. “In the name of God, and in 
the name of these suffering people, I beg you, I implore you, I order you to stop the 
repression.”75 The response did not take long and the next day Monsignor Romero was 
killed while celebrating mass. 
The eighties were marked by war. The size and firepower of the Salvadoran army 
grew enormously. The  military used a strategy in which they carried out many massacres 
against the civilian population. The Salvadoran people will likely never forget the horror 
of such massacres as, the Sumpul River massacre in Morazan in May 1980, and the El 
Mozote massacre in Morazan in December 1981.  
On the other hand the FMLN attacked the electric and transportation 
infrastructure of the country by continuously toppling electricity poles, destroying 
bridges and calling for transportation stoppages. They strategy was directed at exhausting 
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the army, paralyzing the economy and waiting for the appropriate moment for a new final 
offensive. After the 1981 FMLN offensive the popular movement lost its impetus. Many 
activists were assassinated and many others joined the FMLN military forces. 
In March of 1982 elections were called in order to form a Constituent Assembly. 
This Assembly elected Dr. Alvaro Magana as a provisional president. During the 1984 
presidential elections there was a difficult contest between ARENA and the PDC. The 
PDC (left-hand party) won and Duarte became president. Duarte’s reformist attempt 
failed because of the obstinate opposition of the oligarchy. In March of 1989 ARENA 
won the elections, and Alfredo Cristiani was named president.     
On November 11, 1989, the guerrilla, through its group FMLN, initiated its 
strongest military offensive of the war. During this “final offensive” on November 16, a 
unit of the Atlacatl Battalion assassinated six Jesuit priests in the Central America 
University. Although the government, with the unconditional support of the United 
States, was able to control the situation, the guerrilla offensive made evident that neither 
one of the two forces could defeat the other by military means. Both sides were 
exhausted.  
The assassination of the Jesuit priests greatly discredited the Cristiani government 
and unleashed strong international pressure to put an end to the war through negotiations. 
In the end realism took root, accelerating the desire for a negotiated solution to the 
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conflict. New dialogues with the mediation of the United Nations led to the signing of the 
Peace Accords in the city of Chapultepec, Mexico, on January 16, 1992.76 
 
3. Constitutionally 
During the 1970s, the political opposition was excluded from government by 
fraudulent elections; and the peaceful protests of students, workers, and peasants were 
brutally repressed. Within these restrictive parameters, a number of political crimes were 
possible. Governments were sometimes one-man dictatorships, or at other times 
institutional regimes in which military officers governed collegially. The military 
governments served oligarchic interests, but also favored the military’s own institutional 
interests when this occasionally deviated from those of the oligarchy.   
Repression of the masses was at time brutal and total, but it was often selective, 
used only when necessary and sometimes relieved by populist or progressive features of 
military rule. 
a. Mandate 
 The mandate was always given by the military. The stated purpose was to 
eliminate the guerrillas, targeting mostly the civilian population. Particularly hard hit 
were those workers, students, squatters, peasants, and displaced citizens who tried to 
organize themselves to protect their rights and to improve their well being. From 1979 
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through 1989, 40,000 to 50,000 civilians died in the conflict, mainly at the hands of the 
U.S. trained and supplied military. 77 
 The death squads that became active in the late 1970s had their historical 
roots in El Salvador’s three security forces, which often functioned as a law unto them. 
Each security service had its own special unit charged with assassinating suspected 
subversives. As mentioned previously, each security had its own special unit: The PH’s 
intelligence section, the S-2, in particular was persistently linked to the political killings 
and kidnappings that became commonplace in the 1970s and early 1980s. In 1984 this 
unit was disbanded, but six months later it was replaced by a forty-member police force 
trained in intelligence work by the PN.78 
 Ultra-rightists, within the military, security forces, and the oligarchy also 
organized death squads to eliminate leftist activists and sympathizers and to deter popular 
support through intimidation. Analysts generally agreed that the right-wing death squads 
often composed of active-duty military or security force personnel operating with the 
complicity of some senior officers of the armed forces were responsible for thousands of 
murders in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, the regime’s security forces 
themselves became increasingly violent.               
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b. Structure 
 The only strategic intelligence organization was controlled by the military, 
to protect the interests of the oligarchy, as Figure 4 shows. This military intelligence 
apparatus, known as the National Defense Directorate (Departamento Nacional de 
Inteligencia, DNI) was under the Minister of Defense’s control.  
 The DNI’s mission was to gather, analyze and divulge information for the 
strategic level. However due to the lack of resources and the inadequate coordination 
with the operational and tactical intelligence information sections, which were under the 
C-II (Intelligence of the General Staff), the DNI was also collecting and processing data 
for the operational and tactical level.  
 This was a duplication of effort, but no one did anything to correct the 
problem during the war. It seems that this duplication of effort was done with the 
intention of double checking the intelligence reports, since one agency was under the 
Chief of Staff and the other under the Office of the Minister of Defense.79  
The following diagram, figure 4, shows the structure of El Salvador’s 
Intelligence System under its authoritarian regimes. This diagram has been designed by 
the author of this thesis. It is based on the information previously presented.    
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 Oversight was executed by the military to protect the oligarchy’s interests 
and their interests. During this period of authoritarian regimes even discussing 
intelligence was taboo. Little information about this fact exists because as Robert Bishop 
pointed out in his book, Russia Astride the Balkans, “There are many matters, which 
must be left untold because they are within the bounds of security.”80 
  In sum, El Salvador’s Intelligence Service during all its period of 
authoritarian regime was under the control of the military. They performed their activities 
to protect the interests of the oligarchy.  Behaviorally, the heads of this service were 
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taught torture, murder, and the use of force and coercion to achieve political aims. As in 
Argentina’s case, they were rewarded with special training at the US Army School of the 
Americas.81  
  Attitudinally, even though Salvadorans were afraid of the government and 
of its means to impose power, they had a strong civil society well-disposed to fight 
against the government to overcome these abuses of human rights. Constitutionally, there 
was no respect for the rule of law. The only “law” was the pact (which, in fact, was 
illegal) signed in 1932 between the military and the oligarchy. The military gained 
control over the government and the oligarchy enlarged its capital.    
 
D.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 The intensity of human and civil right violations, more than just material 
destruction, has a deep-rooted moral and psychological impact on society. This impact 
certainly shapes the desire of people to find means of ending the suffering and 
destruction, especially if they doubt the legitimacy and validity of this political 
ruthlessness and cruelty. 
 In regard to the three dimensions under analysis, behaviorally, attitudinally, and 
constitutionally, as shown in Table 1, authoritarian intelligence systems, whether 
bureaucratic authoritarianism or totalitarianism presents the same violent and unjust 
characteristics. 
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 Behaviorally, the use of repression, coercion, and violations of human and civil 
rights were the tools the governments used to pursue its individual or elitist goals. 
Romania’s situation was aggravated by the isolation of its population from the rest of the 
world.  
 Attitudinally, Argentina and Romania had weak passive cowering societies 
because of the fear and terror they felt. This bred an attitude of “conformity” and silence. 
On the other hand, El Salvador had a strong civil society well disposed to fight against its 
human and civil right violators. Constitutionally, no rule of law existed. They only 
protected the interests of the elite. Therefore, control and oversight, transparency and 
accountability weren’t even mentioned.  
Table 1 
INTELLIGENCE UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
  
 In these governments the majority of the intelligence services was dedicated to the 
internal security and to the domestic politics. Mult iplicity of intelligence organisms 
existed with their own methods and procedure to gather information, generating 
overlapping of resources, and friction among the different intelligence agencies, a total 
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waste of human and material resources. Such was the case of Argentina. The abuse by the 
decentralized intelligence services in the 1975-1978 period was notorious, and the 
Argentine Navy was a serious competitor to the Army.82 
 During these regimes discussing “changes” was impossible, but as previously 
mentioned, the escalation of violence, the human right violations, the terror, the 
assassinations, the damage to society, led to a public outcry or reaction of strong 
disapproval that eventually toppled the reign of terror. This intensity of violations 
contributed to the changes within the intelligence services. Now the new democratic 
governments face a wicked problem: establishing the new role for security intelligence, 
based on transparency, truth, and freedom, but based mostly on the genuine and 
legitimately democratic participation of all the citizens as (stake holders) in these 
republics. 
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V. CASE STUDIES: INTELLIGENCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC 
REGIMES 
 
 The purpose of this Chapter is to determine whether the strategy used in 
Argentina and Romania to change from an authoritarian intelligence system to a 
democratic intelligence system can be effectively applied in new democracies, such as in 
El Salvador, to restructure its intelligence service. 
 To explore this question, we will examine the similarities in how the intelligence 
services of Argentina and Romania changed and how, their essential differences evolved: 
first, behaviorally; second, attitudinally; and third, constitutionally. These differences 
likely developed from differences in the strategy used for the changes.  
 Argentina used a collaborative strategy to consolidate its democracy. On the other 
hand, Romania used an authoritative strategy, appointing former intelligence officers as 
heads of intelligence organizations. Unfortunately, this was, and still is, a constant 
reminder of past behaviors that could rise again to threaten the consolidation of 
democracy in this country.         
 
A.  ARGENTINA 
On December 10, 1983, Argentina held elections. Though there were candidates 
from smaller parties, the only real contenders were Dr. Raul Alfonsin, from the Radical 
Civic Union, a basically centrist party, despite its name, and Italo A. Luder, who had 
served in the cabinet of Isabel Peron. Alfonsin won overwhelmingly on his slogan, 
“Democracy or Anti-Democracy” and his pledge to fully investigate and to legally 
 78
address the abuses of the prior regime. One of his first acts as president was to appoint 
the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, or CONADEP, and then to take 
testimonies from victims of abduction and torture, from the families and friends of 
desaparecidos, and from other witnesses courageous enough to come forward. After 
twelve months of work, the CONADEP documented 8,960 desaparecidos.  
The CONADEP’s massive report, Nunca Mas! (Never Again!) was published in 
Argentina in 1984, with numerous editions almost immediately selling out. With the 
corroborated evidence, Alfonsin announced that the nine ex-commanders of the first three 
juntas would be charged and tried.83  
Over significant political opposition, he asked the Supreme Tribunal of the 
Military to try its own, thinking that this would make a powerful statement about the 
institution’s willingness to take responsibility and to enact a new moral code. However, 
the military refused, and so, beginning on April 22, 1985, the ex-commanders were 
publicly tried in civilian courts.  
On December 9, 1985, General Videla and Admiral Massera were sentenced to 
prision perpetua (life in prison), their country’s harshest legal punishment. The 
remaining seven ex-commanders received sentences ranging from 4 to 17 years; four of 
the other highest-ranking officers were cited for further investigations. Other members of 
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the military and police were convicted in federal courts in both the nation’s capital and in 
the interior.84 
“Alfonsin wanted, above all, to reestablish democracy, gird its fragility, and guard 
its future.” With the military restive and unrepentant, the balance was delicate. Even as 
the trials were going on, the military was promoting men who had committed abuses 
during the regime. Alfonsin greatly feared the destabilizing effects of widespread 
prosecutions and court cases continuing for years. In fact on February 14, 1984, he 
charitably promulgated the controversial law 23.049, usually referred to as the Due 
Obedience Law, which allowed lower-ranking personnel to claim that they had merely 
been “following orders.” 
In December 1986, Alfonsin set February 23, 1987, as the Punto Final (Final 
Point), or cut-off date for all trials related to the Dirty War. According to a 1988 study by 
the important human rights group CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales), some 
400 repressors benefited from “due obedience” and whereas 450 torturers or enforces 
were tried prior to the Punto Final deadline, hundreds of other cases had to be dropped.85 
In 1983, President Alfonsin tried to demilitarize the SIDE but lacked a strategy 
for building a reliable intelligence service. Unhappy with SIDE’s performance, he 
attempted to give the CNI supremacy without developing a clear plan for controlling the 
intelligence apparatus. The CNI board (five civilians and six military) was supposed to 
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control the flow of intelligence information but, unfortunately, SIDE’s Secretary Suarez 
was its director. From its inception it was unclear which agency was primarily 
accountable for intelligence matters.86 
The major political parties (Radicals and Peronists) diverged on whether SIDE or 
CNI should be the senior intelligence agency, and both parties used the issue for political 
purposes. Concurrently, Alfonsin favored the application of “due obedience” laws 
(following orders), which exonerated military officers for being tried for human rights 
violations. 
During the prolonged period of military regimes and weak civilian governments 
(1955-1983) in Argentina, the civilian intelligence organizations’ products had no impact 
on the decision-making process. The most important intelligence products came from the 
armed forces, as the SIDE had limited operational capacity for processing classified 
information and conducting covert operations. With democracy’s reestablishment in 
Argentina, there were significant changes in national defense and internal security 
matters, but less in the civil intelligence arena.87 
In 1989-1999, President Menem, knowing that the military was guilty of human 
rights violations, and that retaining its internal security role was a sensitive matter for the 
armed forces, made two controversial decisions. He declared a general amnesty for the 
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military, and re-authorized the military’s internal security role despite the new 1988 
Defense Law expressly prohibiting the military from such a role.88  
The Menem’s administration was characterized by an imperial presidency, 
centralization of power and consolidation of coercive control by the executive over an 
increasingly impatient population. The administration weakened or bypassed the judicial 
and legislative branches of government. Military hostilities abated, and the armed forces 
did not challenge civilian government to the extent they did during Alfonsin’s term. But 
they exercised political power and shaped political outcomes.  
Menem returned political prerogatives and guardian capabilities removed by 
Alfonsin’s administration to the military. He promoted and authorized internal security 
and intelligence functions for the armed forces, echoed their national security values, and 
expanded the state’s capacities for repression and intelligence. In effect, Menem drew on 
military reserved domains and guardian capabilities to secure his own neoliberal project. 
Menem’s partnership with the military cupulas, his economic restructuring, and his 
weakening of democratic institutions created the contours of a new form of exclusionary, 
guardian democracy.   
In 2000, President De La Rua began sweeping changes. He appointed 
Santiabanes, a civilian banker, to head the SIDE. He also met with numerous civilian and 
military stakeholders, members of the National Intelligence Council, in the Presidential 
Palace for a two-hour meeting in which he ordered them to reverse the current trend and 
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to coordinate their tasks. His new priority for intelligence is investigating terrorism, drug 
trafficking, corruption, smuggling, and tax evasion. 89 
The SIDE secretary is also working with legislators to draft a bill authorizing both 
executive and congressional oversight of the intelligence budget. Further, it would 
establish statute of limitations for maintaining intelligence budget secrecy, and that limit 
could be 5 to 20 years after the execution of a budget. 
 
1.  The Strategy used to change from an Authoritarian Intelligence 
System to a Democratic Intelligence System 
a. Wicked Problem 
  Making a transition from an authoritarian intelligence system to a 
democratic intelligence system, in any country, is a difficult process. Analyzing 
Argentina’s case, it meets some of the criteria highlighted in Chapter III.  
  First, in a democracy, all citizens have the right to become stakeholders, 
and regarding intelligence issues, to take into account all the different groups, who want 
to participate in this change is quite difficult. For example, in Argentina, the handling of 
human rights violations was the thorniest issue in the relationship between the new 
government and the armed forces. Human right organizations, which were supported 
mainly by the left, were led by a small group of highly dedicated activists, many of whom 
were relatives of victims of repression. Their demands were basically two: the trial of all 
officers implicated in the kidnappings, torture, illegal imprisonments, and killings of real 
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or imagined opponents of the regime, and the handling of these cases by civilian courts. 
The official position of the military was, on the other hand, that the armed forces had not 
committed any crimes: there had been a war, and those who died had fallen in combat.90 
  Second, a second thorn that developed in Argentina’s restructuring process 
was the fact that as politicians leaders change over time so did their commitment to 
punishing the human right violators of the war. For example, as previously mentioned, 
President Menem, in 1989-1999, after Alfonsin’s new laws, made two controversial 
decisions: He declared general amnesty for the military, and re-authorized the military’s 
internal security role despite the new 1988 Defense Law. While formal electoral 
mechanisms seemed stable, civilian control of the military and intelligence organizations 
had actually diminished in key areas. Argentina was still not a full democracy, and the 
“military question” was still not resolved.  
  Third, a third sensitive issue involved the government’s efforts to obscure 
the nature of the problem, and finally, regarding political issues, such as intelligence, it 
became difficult to define the need for “secrecy” by the different sectors of the 
population. 
b. The Strategy Used to Change 
 In 1985, public discussion began over the issue of a new defense legal 
framework.91 This began to overcome past influences and practices of the military 
                                                 
90 Monica Peralta Ramos and Carlos H. Waisman. From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy in 
Argentina. Westview Press, Colorado, U.S.A., 1987. P. 101.  
91 Jose Manuel Ugarte. “Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia Argentino, Cambiar Ya!” Argentina, 
February 1997. 
 84
regimes. A collaborative strategy was adopted to apply the principles of democracy, such 
as the one that says that: All political decisions require consensus from a plurality of key 
stakeholders about what it should be done and how it should be done.  
 Among the most controversial topics were defining the concept of national 
defense and internal security, and the armed forces’ role in such activities. Secondly, the 
involvement of military intelligence in internal political intelligence operations. As a 
result of the debates a consensus was reached between the two major parties, the Union 
Civica Radical and the Partido Justicialista. The Defense Law was finally approved in 
1988, setting a legal framework and replacing former national security doctrine later 
engendering de facto legislation.     
 
2. Behaviorally 
One of the principal purposes of Alfonsin’s administration, which assumed 
control in December of 1983, was to establish the intelligence agencies within the 
framework of democratic principles. Three aspects, related to intelligence issues, 
summarize the new administration’s efforts.  
First, establishing civilian control over the intelligence system by appointing 
civilians as heads of the State Intelligence Secretary. This was one of the most important 
decisions. Since this period (1983-1989), politicians accepted this practice as an 
unwritten rule. In fact, President Menem appointed two civilians, a journalist and then a 
lawyer, to hold this position.  
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The second effort Alfonsin’s administration focused on was the role of the 
National Intelligence Center as the coordination body in charge of producing strategic 
intelligence. This center gathered intelligence and assessments including the intelligence 
components of the armed forces from other agencies. 
Alfonsin’s third effort involved the jurisdiction of the various Argentinean 
agencies composing the national intelligence system. The National Defense Law 
established that the military intelligence agencies must not be part of domestic policy 
matters.92            
 
3. Attitudinally 
Nowadays, in consolidated, as well as in unconsolidated democracies, there is a 
wide consensus about the need of democratic control and oversight on intelligence 
agencies and activities. This consensus stems from the recent history of political violence 
in Argentina; such democratic control is not easy to achieve but the first steps, perhaps 
the most difficult ones, have already been taken.  
This effort for Argentina society is vitally important to recover from the past. As 
one Argentine put it, “our people have been inert, only recently emerging from the stupor 
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of many years of authoritarianism, fear, and repression… Argentina society was 
anesthetized.”93           
4. Constitutionally 
Under the new democratic scenario in Argentine, some new laws were proposed 
such as the National Defense Law No. 23.554 of 1998, which included several innovated 
aspects. To begin, the concept of National Defense was defined as follows:  
The national defense is the integration and coordinated actions of all the 
forces of the nation for the solut ion of those conflicts, which require the 
use of the Armed Forces, in deterrence or an effective way, to confront 
external aggression. (Article2)  
 
One innovation was that both the roles of the Ministry of Defense and of the Joint 
Staff as an advisory body on military strategy to the minister of Defense were enhanced. 
In his study, “Argentina’s Intelligence after Ten Years of Democracy” Estevez 
argues that Article No. 4 clearly defines the difference between national defense and 
internal security. 94 He also states that one innovation of great importance, specified in 
Article 15, is the prohibition of the military intelligence agencies to conduct activities 
related to domestic political affairs.  
The same article establishes an intelligence agency of a higher level, which would 
be in charge of producing national defense intelligence. This article also states that 
producing military intelligence would fall under a department composed of the 
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intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces. This department would be under the authority 
of the Minister of Defense. Article 15 also provides for the drafting of several related 
bills, including one that provides congressional oversight for the intelligence system. 
Another important improvement, cited by Estevez, has been establishing a legal 
framework for domestic security by enacting the Internal Security Law No. 24.059 of 
1992. It is remarkable that this bill, based on two previous bills introduced during 1989, 
was approved with a consensus of various political parties, including, once more, the two 
major ones: the Radical and the Peronist. 95 
The new legislation has established, for the first time in Argentina, the basic 
system for planning, coordinating, controlling, and supporting the national law 
enforcement effort devoted to guaranteeing internal security (article 1). This legal 
mechanism is defined as:   
The factual situation under the rule of law in which liberty, life and 
property of the inhabitants, their rights and guarantees and the full validity 
of the institutions of the representative, republican and federal system 
established by the National Constitution are protected. (Article 2) 
 
a. Mandate 
 Regarding the mandate and in order to reach the objectives of the new 
legal reforms, the law establishes the Ministry of Interior as the main coordination level. 
The Minister of Interior becomes responsible for the legal mandate or political command 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
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of the national police effort. This office is also responsible for directing and coordinating 
the activities of the intelligence components of the federal police and the security forces.  
 The new law also proposes creating an Internal Security Council to advice 
the Minister of Interior. It is composed of the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, 
the Secretary for Drug Abuse, Prevention, and Counter-Drug-Trafficking, the 
Undersecretary of Internal Security, the chiefs of the Federal Police, National 
Gendarmery and Argentinean Naval Prefecture, and a certain number of provincial police 
forces chiefs. All of these are permanent members. 
 The bill also provides for a National Direction of Internal Intelligence, 
with the main purpose of avoiding uncertainty about the role of the intelligence 
components devoted to internal security matters. This office is an organization under the  
control of the Undersecretary of Internal Security, which constitutes  
The organ through which the Minister of Interior will exercise the 
functional direction and coordination of the activities of the information 
and intelligence elements of the Federal Police, as well as those of the 
National Gendarmery and the Argentine Naval Prefecture, in these cases, 
exclusively for purposes of internal security. (Article 16)  
 
 Finally, another institution named The Planning and Control Center has 
been created as an assistance and advisory body, which is responsible for the logistics of 
all plans (Article 15).96      
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b. Structure 
 Today, the structure of the intelligence community in Argentina consists 
of the following components:97 
· Civilian Intelligence Agencies and Elements: 
* The National Intelligence Center (CNI), a coordination and analytical 
body with some operational activities. Created in 1972 and ruled by a 
secret presidential decree. Despite its name, this office hasn’t had a 
prominent role and since 1983 several efforts were made to reinforce its 
role as head of the community. 
* State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) 2, charged with collecting and 
producing foreign and domestic intelligence and counter- intelligence. This 
is the most important agency with delegations within as well as outside 
Argentine. It is subordinated to the President and is ruled by secret decrees 
and laws. Born under a different name in 1946, it suffered several changes 
until 1956, when its present name was adopted. 
* National Direction of Internal Intelligence, a coordination body of the 
intelligence efforts related to domestic security within the Ministry of 
Interior. It was recently created and is ruled by the Internal Security Law 
of 1992 and by a presidential decree (No. 1.273/92) related to that law. 
 
                                                 
97 Ibid.  
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· Military Intelligence: 
* J-2 Intelligence, Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. 
* Army Intelligence, including a G-2 within the Army General Staff and a 
Military Intelligence Collection Center (CRIM) 3, with several small units 
spread through out the country and formerly known as, The Army 
Intelligence Battalion 601 (Batallon de Inteligencia 601). 
* The Naval Intelligence Service, under the jurisdiction of the Navy 
General Staff. 
* The Air Force Information Service, a component within the Air Force 
Staff. 
· Security Forces Intelligence: 
* An intelligence component of the National Gendarmery. 
* An intelligence component of the Argentinean Naval Prefecture. 
· Other Intelligence Elements: 
* Intelligence directions or units in provincial governments. An example is 
the Direction of Information under the Security Secretary of the Buenos 
Aires Province Executive. 
* Intelligence elements of the Argentina’s Federal Police (PFA) 4 and of 
the police forces of the provinces. 
 91
* An intelligence element within the Federal Penitentiary Service of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
* The Federal Service Against Drug Trafficking (SEFECONAR) 5, a small 
intelligence unit with police functions created through a secret Presidential 
decree (No. 717, April 18, 1991) under the jurisdiction of the Secretary for 
Coordination and Programming for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and the 
Fight against Drug Trafficking. A matter of controversy, its existence has 
not been acknowledged by the Menem Administration.   
c. Oversight 
 One fundamental yet critical provision of the Internal Security Law was its 
mandate for congressional oversight. Title VII incorporated five Articles (33 through 37) 
devoted to the parliamentary control of internal security and intelligence agencies and 
activities. Article 33 created a congressional Joint Committee on Intelligence and Internal 
Security with the mission to supervise and control all internal security and intelligence 
agencies and organizations. This committee is composed of six senators and six deputies. 
For the first time, Estevez argued, in Argentina a permanent congressional committee 
would exercise oversight of those matters. Article 35 specifies that:  
The committee shall verify that the performance of the agencies and 
organizations referred in article 33 is adjusted strictly to the constitutional, 
legal, and regulating norms on force, stating the strictly observance and 
respect of the National Constitution individual guarantees, as well as of 
the measures contained in the Human Rights American Convention, 
known as ‘San Jose de Costa Rica Agreement’ and included in Argentina 
legal arrangement through the law No. 23.054. 
(More details are written in article 36:)  
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The committee shall have all the authorities and functions needed to fulfill 
its assignments and especially to make those investigations, which may be 
pertinent in the agencies and organizations mentioned in article 33. It shall 
be especially authorized to: 
a. Require from any agency or national, provincial, or municipal 
public entity, as well as from priva te entities, all the information 
deemed necessary, which must be supplied. 
b. Require the Judicial Branch to summon and make appear with 
public force assistance those persons which are deemed pertinent, 
in order to expose facts linked to the subject of the committee. 
c. Require the pertinent judicial branch components to prevent that 
those persons subjected to investigations to be undertaken, leave 
the national territory within permission. 
d. Propose to the Executive Branch those measures intended to 
overcome the deficiencies observed on the occasion of the 
investigations put forward. 
In sum, the democratic advances achieved are largely the result of pressures from 
Argentina’s civilian society and several organizations activated in the cause of human 
rights and democracy. Democratization has been pushed from below, Argentines have 
reacted to fortify its civil society to ensure democracy, respect for the rule of law and 
protection of human rights.  
With Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983 there was a general consensus 
about the need to rethink the role of the armed forces. The military problem is one of the 
major concerns related to the stability of the system and within it the intelligence issue is 
one of the most important concerns. Three main points have been identified that need 
urgently to be solved: First, the establishment of the intelligence agencies’ limits. Second, 
to terminate the autonomy of those agencies and third, to end with the involvement of the 
military in domestic and political intelligence.   
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Using a collaborative strategy a great effort has been made to solve the military 
problem through judicial, political and legislative actions. Discussions and debates of 
intelligence organizations have always been part of other fundamental issues under public 
and political consideration, such as national defense and internal security. Although there 
have been improvements during some years of democratic regime, the challenge to fully 
adapt intelligence to democracy is still unfinished.     
 
B.  ROMANIA 
Given the deteriorating Romanian economic situation and the growth of social 
unrest in the 1980s, the loyalty of the security and intelligence services was critical to the 
political future of the Ceausescu clan. 98  
Despite their treatment as a privileged caste, Securitate personnel showed signs of 
dissatisfaction with the regime and with the situation in the country during the late 1980s. 
Poor living conditions were so widespread that even these privileged individuals were 
affected, creating sympathy for a largely discontented population.  
The intelligence services played a decisive role in the outcome of the leadership 
struggle between Ceausescu, his heirs, and other contenders for power. In 1989, when the 
dictatorial regime collapsed, the directorates of the Secur itate were the largest component 
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of the Ministry of Interior. They also comprised Eastern Europe's largest secret police 
establishment in proportion per capita.99 
Today, to the eyes of the world, Romanian is a constitutional democracy with a 
multiparty, bicameral system, a head of government (Prime Minister), a directly elected 
head of state (president), and a separate judiciary.  
The Ministry of Internal Affairs supervises the police. The national police have 
the primary responsibility for security, but the government may call on the army and 
border guards to assist the police in maintaining internal order. The Romanian 
Intelligence Service (SRI) conducts intelligence functions. Elected civilian authorities are 
supposed to exercise control over the security forces, many of whose senior officers the 
government replaced in 1997. 
Unfortunately, the parliament has not been able to integrate the country’s diverse 
political forces or to provide a counterweight against the unrestrained use of personal 
power. Since October 1992, the government has shown a disinclination to co-operate 
with the parliament on major issues. It has been very reluctant to allow parliament a 
supervisory role over the state media or the security services, two areas that are regarded 
as crucia l for the maintenance of political authority. 100 
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1.  The Strategy used to change from an Authoritarian Intelligence 
System to a Democratic Intelligence System 
a. Wicked Problem 
 The collapse of the communist system is of course a great step toward 
democracy, but it is only the beginning of a hard, painful, and long road to face a wicked 
problem such as the development of democratic institutions. The problem is that 
communism not only has roots in the institutions that have remained behind, but that 
communism is engrained in the attitudes of the people, and continues to influence their 
behavior and habits, and determines their values. Mircea Codreanu, a former diplomat, 
noted that had Elena Ceausescu lived, she should have been tried “for genocide not of 
people but of culture and education.”101  
 The change of the authoritarian intelligence system to a democratic 
intelligence system in Romania has been and is still a wicked problem to be solved. First, 
because in countries like Romania, on account of their delayed development, a strong 
civil society hardly rises, that is a society that independently express its interests and 
opinions and, equally important, control political power and not allow it to be abused. 
This characteristic can’t allow stakeholders to make decisions beneficial to society. 
 Second, dictatorships like that of Ceausescu can exist only in an 
environment characterized by fostering and maintaining the low level of its culture. 
Culture is the greatest enemy of dictatorial power. Nicolae Manolescu said, “The 
dictatorship had smashed life into a thousand pieces, but what were we to do with our 
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freedom which had come to us, as it were, from the skies? Yes, hundreds of people had 
died for it; their sacrifice a wonderful gift, but we still feel very confused. It seemed that 
we had to learn everything all over again: thinking, speaking, trading, printing, papers 
and books, re-establishing connections with the rest of the world, and great many other 
things.”102         
 Finally, the Ceausescu regime left Romania bankrupt politically, 
economically, and morally. Years of economic privation, social incarceration, intellectual 
abuse, and isolation from outside world had brutalized the population. Suspicion, 
jealously, and fear of institutions identified with the Ceausescu regime could not be 
erased overnight. 
 Under this scenario, the very means whereby the new power holders 
consolidated their position was reminiscent of tactics used in the past by the Romanian 
Communist party to railroad through decisions that would otherwise have been contested. 
b. The Strategy Used to Change 
 In 1990, using an authoritative strategy, the Securitate was officially 
disbanded and replaced by the Romanian Intelligence Service and some other intelligence 
services. Since that year, waves of changing have been taking place in both the personnel 
and the leadership of the Romanian Intelligence establishment. With the view of getting 
rid of the communist style, methods, and mentalities, this affecting primarily former 
security officers who had failed to adjust to the new political environment. The presence 
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in the beginning of a considerable number of former securitate officers within the SRI 
ranks was perceived as the main obstacle to a complete overhaul of the Romanian 
intelligence system. 103 
 Combining authoritative and collaborative strategies, the press has very 
much supported the reform process. One of the most significant steps taken by the 
Romanian society was establishing the rules for the organizing and operating of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service by the vote of the first elected parliament after the 1989 
revolution. However, the new National Salvation Front, which was composed of an elite 
group of leaders, had its own secrets, its own exclusive rules. General Kostyal, one of the 
primary leaders responsible for the revolution, discovered on the second day of the 
uprising, doors were very quickly closed nearly as tightly as they had been in the past.104 
 Some of Romania’s dissidents very quickly lost their illusions. Ana 
Blandiana became a short- lived second vice-president of the first National Salvation 
Front government, then referred to as a council. After its first session, she said, it was 
composed of a few well-known dissidents, and students and others who had been on the 
streets during the revolution. Blandiana resigned as vice-president a few days later. At the 
council’s second session in January, she noted, the 40-member council had 140 members, 
and there were no longer any students among them, “They had been squeezed out.”105        
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Despite some positive changes that have occurred in the last few years, like, 
freedom of political activity and of travel, a free press and the emergence from the 
international isolation, many critics of the present regime argue that Ceausescu’s legacy 
lives on and still remains strong. 
Indeed, after the December 1989 downfall of Ceausescu’s regime, the carefully 
erected and brutally maintained security services structures disappeared and were 
replaced by some nine new independent secret organizations, set up on the legacy of 
more than 40 years of communist mentality.  
Based on the legacy of former Securitate’s methods, these successor services have 
managed in the last few years to greatly increase their power. And as a proper 
parliamentary scrutiny is still far from being achieved, they could very easily push 
Romanian society toward authoritarianism, especially when democratic institutions and 
processes are new and untried.       
In Romania a clear and present danger capable of threatening this post-communist 
fragile democracy is indisputably coming from its overlapping secret services structures 
and their association with the notorious Securitate. Legitimacy is still a great challenge 
for the government to achieve.106 
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3. Attitudinally 
Unfortunately, Romania’s suspicious society with its little support for religious-
cultural tolerance and individual self-reliant behavior, combined with the way in which 
the old system ruled and the way it collapsed, has not really helped to eliminate this 
inheritance. People are still afraid of the Securitate and afraid of a possible return to an 
authoritarian regime.  
The people abolished the dictator, not so they could turn to the building of a 
democracy, but so that they could open up the borders and leave. Hundreds of thousands 
of Romanians are flooding into Europe today. They are emigrating because they do not 
believe in the chance of democracy and prosperity in their own country. That is one of 
the triumphs of communism: “It knows how to plant in people the conviction that 
communism, together with its prisoners and poverty, is an enduring and indestructible 
structure, impossible to reform or change.”107     
 
4. Constitutionally 
The Romanian Democratic Intelligence Service was founded in March 1990, as 
part of the national defense system. It is a state specialized body, collecting intelligence 
related to the national security, and it is the only Romanian secret service under 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
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In its relation to other public authorities, the Romanian Intelligence Service is an 
autonomous administrative authority, which cooperates with the other departments 
engaged in national security, as well as with other public authorities. 
The Romanian Intelligence Service was established by Decree No. 181 issued on 
the 26th of March 1990, as a necessity for a competent specialized body for collecting 
national security intelligence. The SRI operates according to a law, which defines its 
rules, duties, and attributions, and to a law referring to the defense of Romanian’s 
national security.  
The 1992 National Security Law defines national security very broadly and lists 
as threats not only crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed 
insurrection, but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions, or attempts to change 
the existing national borders. Security officials can enter residences without proper 
authorization from a prosecutor if they deem a threat to national security to be 
“imminent.” 
The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of communication is 
inviolable; thus, the Romanian Intelligence Service is legally prohibited from engaging in 
political acts. To ensure the political equidistant of the Romanian Intelligence Service, its 
military or civilian personnel is forbidden by law to adhere to political parties or to any 
organization with a political or secret character. 
The role of the service is stipulated by the Romanian’s Constitution (article 62, 
letter g) which provides that the two Parliament Chambers should gather in common 
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session to appoint the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service and to debate upon 
its annual activity report.108       
a. Mandate 
 The SRI is a Romanian authority qualified to collect and to evaluate 
national security intelligence, without causing violations to human liberties. Its 
jurisdiction extends, exclusively, to the national territory. It organizes and perform 
activities of collecting, verifying, and assessing intelligence for the evaluation, 
prevention, and countering of any actions that according to law, may pose a threat to 
Romanian’s national security. It also engages in activities concerning the safeguarding of 
state secrets and the prevention of the disclosure of secret information, which according 
to law is not meant to become public knowledge. 
 By its specialized structures, the SRI develops intelligence and technical 
activities meant to prevent and to counter terrorism and also performs antiterrorist 
intervention against any target under attack or occupied by terrorists.  
 On special occasions defined by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council, 
the Romanian Intelligence Service provides anti-terrorist protection for Romanian and 
foreign officials, as well as for persons who are under international protection, especially 
when threatened by terrorist acts.  
 At the same time, the SRI is engaged in activities for countering such 
crimes as the manufacture, possession or usage of illegal means for intercepting 
communications. By all these activities, the Romanian Intelligence Service is an 
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instrument of law enforcement in national security, regularly and systematically 
informing the authorities that are responsible for law enforcement any time a law 
infringement occurs.109 
 The SRI is meant to be a non-repressive body with no responsibilities in 
criminal proceedings. The SRI Law provides that the SRI cannot undertake criminal 
proceedings, cannot arrest or detain persons, and has no imprisonment statutes. In 
complex cases, when specialized assistance is needed, at the request of competent 
judiciary authorities, certain nominated persons from the Romanian Intelligence Service 
may provide professional help in some criminal proceedings concerning offences against 
national security. 110                    
 According to law, all the activities of the Romanian Intelligence Service 
are controlled by the Parliament. Legally, the Romanian Intelligence Service activities 
are also controlled by judiciary authorities.  
 Unlike the case of the Securitate, activities that may temporarily restrain 
some fundamental citizen rights and liberties may be undertaken only under the power of 
a warrant issued by a prosecutor (attorney) specifically appointed by Romania’s 
Prosecutor General. This is done only after the information possessed by the SRI 
concerning threats to the national security is judiciary evaluated. Any citizen who 
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considers him or herself prejudiced by the prosecutor’s warrants or activities may 
complain to a prosecutor higher in rank than the one who issued the warrant.111 
 The activities concerning national security conducted by the Romanian 
Intelligence Service are also controlled and coordinated by the Country’s Supreme 
Defense Council, an authority created by Law no. 39/1990 (published in Monitorial 
Oficial no. 142/1990).  
 This law was created in order to coordinate and to organize jointly all 
activities concerning country defense and state security, both in times of peace and of 
war. In this respect, the Country’s Supreme Defense Council analyzes the data and 
intelligence collected by the Romanian Intelligence Service and assesses the state of 
national security. This establishes the main lines of action. 112 
 The whole SRI activity is characterized by observance of the Constitution 
of citizen rights and liberties and of the other laws that establish the legal framework for 
national security defense. Within the Service, internal rules were adopted to create a 
demanding legal framework that requires a strict observance of the law during the 
process of fulfilling its functional attributions. The SRI has a legal division that checks 
upon the legitimacy of the actions and measures undertaken in all phases of intelligence 
activity.           
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b. Structure 
 After the downfall of Ceausescu’s regime, in December 1989, the old 
security services disappeared to be replaced by new independent secret organizations, set 
up on the legacy of more than forty years of communist mentality. They are as follows: 
· Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI);  
· Protection and Guard Service of the Presidency;  
· Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;  
· Operative Surveillance and Intelligence Directorate of the General Police 
Inspectorate (subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs);  
· Foreign Intelligence Service (attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); 
· Counterintelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Directorate of the Army 
(the Ministry of National Defense); an intelligence structure within the 
General Directorate of the Penitentiaries (the Ministry of Justice);  
· Special Telecommunications Service, which claims to be a military body, 
although it is not subordinated to the Defense Ministry. 113   
 The Guard and Protection Service (SPP), established on May 7th, 1990 as 
the Special Guard and Protocol Unit, is a new version of the former Directorate V of the 
Department of the State Security, but is a different entity that inherited neither the 
structures, nor the equipment of the Old Security Department. The main task of the 
service is to ensure anti- terrorist protection for Romanian dignitaries and their foreign 
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guests, and to guard their headquarters and residences. The SPP is an autonomous, 
military-administrative authority controlled by the parliament and coordinated by the 
Supreme Council for the Defense of the Country (CSAT).114 
 The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) is the first new secret service to be 
built on the ruins of the old regime. It was set up on 18 January 1990, and its personnel 
and leadership have also known various transformations.115 
 The Special Telecommunication Service, set up in June 1993, is officially 
defined as a “central body specializing in the field of special telecommunications.” Its 
“organization, functioning and main prerogatives are set out by the Supreme Council for 
the Defense of the Country.” The position of a STS director is equivalent to that of a 
secretary of state. 
 The Operative Surveillance and Intelligence Directorate appears to focus 
on specific police-related tasks, and especially on combating organized crime, including 
cross-border criminality.               
c. Oversight 
 The SRI Establishment Act (Decree no. 181, March 26, 1990) provides 
that the Romanian Intelligence Service will be responsible for its activity before the 
Parliament, and its Director will present periodic reports containing the conclusions 
resulting from its specific activities.  
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 For exercising the Parliamentary control over the activities of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service, according to Decision no. 30 from 1993 of the Romanian 
Parliament (published in the Monitorul Oficial no. 183, June 1993), a Permanent Joint 
Parliamentary Commission of the Senate and the Deputies Chamber was established. The 
Commission has nine members, two are senators and seven are deputies. According to 
this Decision, the members (no members of other commissions) are elected in a Common 
Session of the two Chambers, by a vote of the majority of senators and deputies. 
 The Commission is elected for the period of the Parliamentary Mandate. 
In fulfilling its duties, the commission may request from the Romanian Intelligence 
Service reports, intelligence, written explanations, and it can interview individuals in 
connection with the analyzed problems. The principal activities of the Commission are: 
· It is authorized to verify whether during the fulfillment of its duties 
the Romanian Intelligence Service observes the provision of the 
Constitution and of other laws; 
· It examines the cases where law infringement appears; 
· It analyzes and verifies citizens who claim that their rights and 
liberties have been violated, by the means or methods used by the 
SRI;  
· It verifies how the SRI budgetary funds are used. 
 
 Besides the control of the Parliamentary Commission, the Romanian 
Intelligence Service presents yearly or whenever the Parliament requires, reports about 
the way it fulfills its functions. The Commission presents to the Parliament an annual 
report regarding its control activities and its conclusions. The Commission Report will be 
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presented to the Parliament at the same time as the report of the Romanian Intelligence 
Service.116 
 In sum, the Romanian revolution is a case of an unfinished revolution. The 
leader has gone, but his people remain. The leader has gone, but the world he has created, 
or at least many of its structures, institutions, and customs, lives on, quite often to the 
astonishment  and disillusionment of those who, fought against it had counted on a rapid 
and final victory.  
 In a 1993 poll, twenty-seven per cent of Romanian responders when asked 
what sort of government they would like, expressed a preference for ‘an authoritarian, 
iron-fisted leadership.’ Later in the same year, a different poll found that 58.8 percent of 
responders had no confidence in the ability of the government to solve outstanding 
national problems, while 66.8 per cent felt that a government reshuffle would make no 
difference. To make matters worse, thirty-nine per cent of responders in a further 1993 
poll doubted the ability of the reformist opposition to rescue the country, fifty per cent of 
responders had no confidence in any party, and sixty per cent were disenchanted with the 
performance of both parliament and government.117          
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C.  EL SALVADOR 
 Before 1984 it was unthinkable to talk about negotiation with the Salvadoran 
guerrillas. The armed forces were convinced that they could control the situation by 
repression. Negotiation by that time would have meant showing weakness and 
legitimizing the insurgents. Before 1984 it was easy to the military to sustain the war 
effort, for the military controlled the national resources and the government. The military 
initially had no intention to compromise the military power, but to arrange the FMLN 
demobilization. At the same time the hard- liners within the FMLN demanded the armed 
forces capitulation and a substantial share of power. 
In 1992, after thirteen years of war, the Salvadoran Government and the 
guerrilla’s front, Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), signed the Peace 
Agreements in Mexico. This agreement was a watershed event in achieving control over 
the military by the elected civilian government, placing the country on the road to a 
consolidated democracy. 
 The most important achievement of the Peace Agreement was the recognition of 
the need for social, political, and military changes that had to be carried out in El 
Salvador in order to move the country out of the civil war. And the most important lesson 
was that the process of pacification is not dependent solely on the good will of the 
guerrillas or on the offensive military operations. It is a national responsibility in which 
labor unions, traditional parties, and the rightists groups have to accept that the 
negotiation process implies mutual concessions. 
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 In short, the peace agreements were approached through four main topics: 1) the 
role of the armed forces; 2) the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions; 3) 
the economic and social matters; and, 4) the end of the FMLN military structure and legal 
reentry of its members into civil, political, and institutional life. 
With the end of the war, a long period of national reconstruction began. The 
FMLN demobilized its military force and became a legal political party. The old 
repressive state security structures were dissolved and a new National Civilian Police 
(PNC) was created. The armed forces learned that they can participate in the building or 
strengthening of a democratic system, by keeping four essential attitudes: first, to avoid 
interfering in the political process. Second, to modernize their organization to meet the 
new military threats. Third, not to allow any member to act above the law, which they are 
supposed to defend and fourth, to use their intelligence service to serve both the security 
of the nation and a respect for human rights.       
The civilian government, under Cristiani’s administration, assessed the 
intelligence organization and created a new State Intelligence Agency (Organismo de 
Inteligencia de Estado, OIE) on April 28, 1992. The OIE was created as an advisory 
organism of the president of the republic in political, economic, social and security 
issues.118 
The Reglamento del Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado (OIE) establishes the 
structure, missions and responsibilities of this organism. The way the Reglamento is 
                                                 
118 Executive Decree. Reglamento del Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado, OIE. Ministerio de 
la Presidencia, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Junio 29, 1992. 
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written lacks of clarity and allows one to use it according to his or her conveniences and 
interests. It also gives too much authority to the president and it lacks of specific laws of 
Judicial or Legislative control and oversight.    
By June15, 1992, the dissolution of the DNI (Departamento Nacional de 
Inteligencia) was carried out. The OIE conducted an evaluation of the personnel working 
at the former DNI, and offered employment to those interested. The majority of the 
personnel who passed the selection process accepted the offer and started working for the 
OIE. However, not all the files collected by the DNI during the war were transferred to 
the new intelligence agency. As Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter noted, “The military 
refusal to turn over these files raised doubts about its sincerity in removing itself from the 
intelligence functions.”119 
The final consideration in this aspect is that the only school for intelligence 
training is under military control and all personnel, civilians and military who are 
interested in intelligence must attend this school.120 
In this process of achieving control over the military, the Salvadoran military 
completed the transition of relinquishing the control over the strategic intelligence 
agencies. However, the military retained the capability to perform strategic intelligence 
gathering without civilian supervision. Therefore the civilian control over this issue has 
not been completed yet. It still remains a wicked problem.  
                                                 
119 Philip J. Williams and Walter Knut, Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s 
Transition to Democracy, (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). P. 162. 
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1. Still a Wicked Problem 
 Clearly among the principal four topics of the peace agreements: 1) the role of the 
armed forces; 2) the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions; 3) the 
economic and social matters; and, 4) the end of the FMLN military structure and legal 
reentry of its members into civil, political, and institutional life, the role of the armed 
forces has been the most complicated issue related to the peace accords.  
 The intelligence issues have remained almost as in the past, which is a problem 
that needs an immediately resolution. This is a wicked problem for several reasons. First, 
historically, the coups d’etat against authoritarian regimes have been led by the military. 
Therefore the military services perceive themselves as the leaders of the democratic 
movement rather than the followers, and are reluctant to surrender this position. 
Regarding intelligence issues they know they are the only ones knowledgeable in these 
matters. 
 The military services also feel that receiving orders directly from civilians is not 
right because the civilians do not know or understand military objectives. From my point 
of view, “Civilians don’t even know what intelligence is about.” A civilian elite 
knowledgeable in military issues and capable of exercising effective oversight doesn’t 
exist. Therefore, despite the fact that according to the national Constitution the president 
is the Commander- in-Chief of the Salvadoran military, the top military officer, or the 
minister of defense is actually in charge of the military and is still a military person. 
                                                                                                                                                 
120 The National School of Intelligence (Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia, ESNACIN) is currently 
under the C-II of the General Staff of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The school offers basic and advanced 
intelligence courses at level II and level III for civilians and international students.    
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 Another problem that makes the military issue so complicated is the fact that the 
Salvadoran legislature has not historically been involved in defense matters. The military 
actions have always been controlled directly by the military without any civilian 
supervision. Until the end of the world in 1992, the OIE was created and for the first 
time, the military is now dependent on the budget approved by the Legislative Assembly. 
 To summarize, civilians must exercise oversight over the military, but achieving 
military subordination to civilian authority is difficult due to the absence of civilian 
leadership that is knowledgeable about defense matters. 
 In El Salvador, just recently with the creation of the Colegio de Altos Estudios 
Estrategicos (High Strategic Studies), some civilians have started receiving education in 
national defense and military related matters. This will be helpful, but naturally it will 
take some time before these graduates acquire some experience and start filling the 
vacancies in governmental and ministerial positions.  
 To change the Salvadoran’s Intelligence System is still a wicked problem, but El 
Salvador has a strong civil society, which will not allow anybody to commit the abuses of 
the past again.   
 
D.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
There are many dimensions in which the changes in Argentina and Romania can 
be compared. However, we need to keep in mind that we are looking for relevant criteria 
to explain the different attitudes toward the changing process.  
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Broadly speaking, and as shown in Table 2, there are three relevant differences 
between them: 
Table 2 
INTELLIGENCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC REGIME 
 
 STRATEGY BEHAVIORALLY ATTITUDINALLY CONSTITUTIONALLY 









On the Way to 
Strong Society Constitutional 























First, behaviorally Argentina, through the use of a collaborative strategy and 
everybody’s participation, is on the road to establishing legitimacy and transparency. On 
the other hand, with the imposition of former intelligence officers, Romania’s 
government still exhibits a fragile democratic behavior.  
Second, attitudinally, Argentina has improved a stronger civil society, Romania, 
on the other hand, still has a weak society characterized by its citizens’ lack of confidence 
in its government.  
And third, constitutionally, both nations have reached civilian control through the 
parliament. Argentina has implemented a judicial control based on the Canadian model; 
Romania still has a weak judicial control. The main difference under this dimension is 
that Argentina has appointed civilians to oversight and control intelligence, and Romania, 
has appointed former intelligence officers, reminding the Romanian society of the past, 
which in itself looms as a threat to its democratic consolidation. 
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In Chapter III we examined several methods to evaluate the possible strategies 
used to solve wicked problems. Some of these methods included ousting the old 
leadership, generating social capital, changing network structures, altering attitudes and 
behavior, and establishing new laws. The following lists the questions presented in 
Chapter III to evaluate the two strategies: 
· Did the outcome satisfy the real issue in dispute? 
· Did the stakeholders feel they affected the decision? 
· Do the governments have legitimacy? 
· Have the civil societies become stronger with confidence in their 
governments? 
· Have the changes improved the shifts in power distribution? 
· Have the changes improved the creation of shared meanings? 
· Have the new roles reached the balance between the security of the state, 
intelligence activities and individual liberties? 
 The next Chapter concludes that using a collaborative strategy instead of an 
authoritative strategy is the best approach.   
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS/CONCLUSIONS 
 
A.  MATRIX OF COMPARISON 
 The following matrix of comparison shows the characteristics of intelligence 
systems under authoritarian and democratic regimes. The comparison allows one to  
establish some conclusions and recommendations, which are useful to design the new 
role and structure of intelligence sys tems for emerging democracies. 
Table 3. Intelligence under Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes 
 
INTELLIGENCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC REGIME 
 STRATEGY BEHAVIORALLY ATTITUDINALLY CONSTITUTIONALLY 







On the Way to a 
Strong Society Constitutional 























El Salvador’s intelligence system cannot be incorporated within the matrix because it still hasn’t 
totally changed from an authoritarian intelligence system to a democratic intelligence system. No 
strategy to change has been applied yet. It still remains a wicked problem lacking a clear legal 
mandate, structure and oversight.  
 
INTELLIGENCE UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
 STRATEGY BEHAVIORALLY ATTITUDINALLY CONSTITUTIONALLY 
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B.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Even if countries adopt a more restrained policy toward protecting the nation and 
its people, security threats will inevitably emerge from time to time. In a dangerous, 
turbulent, and unpredictable world, the intelligence agencies will be the first line of 
protection, and their effectiveness will largely determine how many nations live or die. 
The use of a collaborative strategy to create a new role of security intelligence and 
to design the model seems to be the most appropriate one. Most of the problems that 
Romania still faces are due to the use of authoritative strategies, for example, the 
appointee of the former intelligence officers in the new democratic institutions. However, 
the use of an authoritative strategy for executing functions and the fulfilling of the new 
role is undoubtedly the most appropriate. Of course, this would only be true if the 
stakeholders embraced the principles of democracy. These principles include 
accountability, rule of law, respect of human and civil rights, and protection of the state.  
To make intelligence agencies more effective and democratic, two obstacles must 
be overcome. First, the intelligence agencies should focus on genuine threats to national 
security, such as terrorism, and not political interests. Second, politically, the president 
and his advisors should view the intelligence agencies as institutions that are most 
valuable when they question the premises of existing policy. That is, admittedly, difficult 
but history demonstrates the consequences of refusing to believe intelligence that 
contradicts the views of the political leadership.  
Behaviorally and constitutionally the civilian leaderships must seek to control the 
intelligence apparatus in such a way that the undemocratic practices can be reduced to a 
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minimum without diminishing the efficiency of the intelligence agencies. Only under a 
scope of a clear legal framework, can intelligence be controlled democratically.  
To be clear and efficient, the democratic legal framework must be able to rule at 
least three areas where the intelligence has to be controlled. First, it must determine what 
function to implement clandestine, collection and analysis and must estimate covert 
actions, and/or counterintelligence. Second, the legal framework must be able to balance 
between the civilian and military organizations, both in terms of production (collection 
and analysis) and consumption. Third, the legal framework must address the relationship 
between intelligence and policy. This also involves the issue of coordinating the 
intelligence organizations and Congress.  
Congress in turn should relate to the intelligence community essentially in three 
ways: by annually providing funds for intelligence, by performing oversight of 
intelligence, and by receiving and using intelligence. 
In determining the degree and quality of civilian control, one must distinguish 
between military participation in government and the military actually generating policy. 
Additionally a high degree of military independence in executing the policies can 
eventually degrade the power of civilian authorities as “mission creep,” which can in 
turn, be used as an excuse to distort the original plans that were ordered.  
There are some prerogatives in intelligence that must be denied to the military to 
achieve civilian control over the military and therefore, complete the transition to a true 
democracy. First, the civilian Minister of Defense should have more control over the 
intelligence system. That office should have jurisdiction over the policies related to 
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intelligence activities. That office should also act as a presidential advisor for national 
security using intelligence as one of its main tools.  
Behaviorally, civilians should be informed of intelligence issues. Civilians also 
need to improve society, seeking a society capable of repelling any threats to its human 
and civil rights.  
In sum, the new democratic intelligence systems must focus on their main 
mission, safeguarding the security of their people. Their main role, must be reaching a 
proper balance among the three main elements: the security of the nation, the intelligence 
activities, and individual liberties.             
  
C.  TO WHAT DEGREE SHOULD SECRECY BE APPLIED? 
This question involves three points. First, to be sure, secrecy in intelligence is still 
required, but it should be refocused. As with all strategies, the use of secrecy has 
advantages, such as the reduction of the stakeholders; and disadvantages, such as the lack 
of citizens’ confidence in their government.  
Second, new democratic governments may at times insulate themselves from 
public opinion and prepare some plans in secret because they are still unconsolidated 
democracies and some degree of secrecy, as in consolidated democracies, is required.  
Third, using this tactic correctly doesn't weaken democracies. Its use should be 
circumscribed by the need to build a safer world, based on law and cooperation and 
should be integrated to the needs of an open and dynamic foreign policy. An appropriate 
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balance must be struck between openness and secrecy in matters of political, social, and 
economic reforms.  
Thus, being unconsolidated or new democracies in which institutions are new and 
legitimacy has yet to be achieved, some risks must be taken and secrecy becomes a 
necessity to perform some reforms. As one economist pointed out, "We could not subject 
economic policies to great debates because this would have weakened our ability for 
implementation."121 
In regard to the advantages, secrecy could be considered an authoritative strategy; 
however, if it is well used, it has advantages in coping with political and economic 
problems. Reducing the number of stakeholders decreases the complexity of the problem 
solving process. If a large number of people are involved, it is hard to get anything done. 
Problem solving can be quicker and less contentious with fewer people involved. It is on 
this basis that citizens elect representatives to govern their country rather than resort to a 
direct democracy, and they keep some residual command and control structures in 
organizations even when they are flattening hierarchies.  
Reliance on experts can also make problem solving more professional and 
objective, especially when specialization provides them with knowledge and 
sophisticated problem solving tools that laymen do not posses. 
Taking time to update non-experts who do not understand the finer points of 
complex issues and who are not familiar with expert procedures wastes valuable time and 
                                                 
121 Catherine Conahan. “Capitalists, Technocrats, and Politicians: Economic Policy Making and 
Democracy in the Central Andes,” in Mainwaring et al Eds. Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. P. 219.  
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resources. Sometimes it is more important for authorities to get on with the work because 
they have the knowledge and skills to deal with; that is why they were given the jobs in 
the first place. 
Secrecy as an authoritative strategy to cope with political problems also has its 
disadvantages. Among these disadvantages, first and foremost, authorities and experts 
can be wrong, about the problem and about the solution. If problem solving is left to 
experts, especially in a democratic society, then citizens can become further distanced 
from the important issues of their time.  
A democracy rests on an informed citizenry, and it is not clear how authoritative 
strategies keep them informed and engaged in the governing process. Overusing secrecy 
can destroy transparency, one of the principles of democracy. Governments can lose 
legitimacy and can lose their international support and investments. 
Finally, the correct use of secrecy does not weaken a democracy. Its adequate use 
can end in a win-win solution for everybody. For example, if secret economic reforms are 
successful, people will feel comfortable with these reforms and democracy prospers. 
Economy and politics run together, if a population is economically satisfied, and 
its civil rights are respected by the rule of law, democracy is going to survive and 
everybody will benefit from social and economic progress.  
Przeworski, in his book Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, argues that in the face of political 
reactions, governments are likely to vacillate between the technocratic political style 
inherent in market-oriented reforms and the participatory style requires maintaining 
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consensus.122 They abandon or postpone some reforms, only to try them again later. The 
vacillations of financially bankrupt governments become political destabilizing. 
In Przeworski's ana lysis about the political implications of implementing these 
reforms, he states, "To be consolidated, democratic institutions must at the same time 
protect all major interests and generate economic reforms."123 He also argues that the 
durability of the new democracies will depend not only on their institutional structure and 
the ideology of the major political forces, but to a large extend on their economic 
performance. Similarly, both democratic consolidation and progress rest on a common 
foundation: the reinforcement of stabilizing expectations. If to perform these reforms 
secrecy is required, governments must act under the principles of the rule of law and of 
accountability.  
   
                                                 
122 Adam Przeworski. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1991, xii.  
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VII. THE NEW ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A 
NEW DEMOCRACY: EL SALVADOR 
  
 
Undoubtedly, the role of intelligence in a democratic society is too important to 
be left without any discussion. In this sense a relevant topic is the prevention of abuses 
which can emerge as consequences of a lack of a tight control on intelligence activities, 
or of politicization. 
A primary goal of the actual government should be to confine the intelligence 
system within the frame of democratic principles. Three aspects should be undertaken in 
the field of intelligence. One establishing civilian control over the area. Two, establishing 
a clear legal mandate and structure. Three, establishing Legislative control and oversight. 
Four, establishing the delimitation of the fields of actions, and five, establishing judicial 
control to ensure the fulfillment of law and respect of human rights.   
 
A.  STRATEGY TO BE USED TO CHANGE THE AIS TO A DIS 
In order to create a model for non-consolidated democracies, it is important to 
start by building a new culture for the nation’s institutions. To do this, the national 
interests must be placed before special interest groups. Legality must control the political 
function, the abuse of power, and the violations of human rights. A collaborative strategy 
should be used to create the new role, mandate, oversight, and the functions of the 
intelligence services. 
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Even though this thesis has suggested the use of a collaborative strategy to create 
a new role for emerging democracies, this work sets the basis for a democracy designed 
with the collaboration of all the stakeholders. The following suggestions are based on the 
analysis of the intelligence systems from Argentina and Romania under their 
authoritarian and democratic regimes and on El Salvador after its authoritarian rule.  
     
B. BEHAVIORALLY 
The Intelligence Service must be dedicated to the protection of El Salvador’s 
national security interest and the safety of the Salvadorans. Its fundamental goal should 
be an outstanding national intelligence organization dedicated to serving the people of El 
Salvador through its government with effectiveness and integrity. 
Transparency, accountability, rule of law and respect of human as well as civil 
rights must be the basis for all intelligence activities in order to safeguard the fragile 
democratic values and institutions recently created.  
This vision will only be achieved by employees who will be guided by the 
principles of excellence, integrity, and respect for the rights of all. Each main task will be 
to produce “good intelligence” which should have at least four qualities. First, the 
intelligence must be timely, getting the information to the policy-makers is more 
important than waiting for every last shred to arrive. Second, tailored, good intelligence 
focuses on the specific information needs of the policy-makers, to whatever depth and 
breadth is required, but without extraneous material. This must be done in such a way 
that it does not lose objectivity or politicize the intelligence. Third, digestible, good 
intelligence has to be in a form and of a length that will allow policy-makers to grasp 
 125
what they need to know as easily as possible. And fourth, it must be clear regarding the 
known and the unknown. Good intelligence must convince the reader of what is known, 
of what is unknown, and of what has been added by analysis. The degree in confidence of 
all of the material is also important.124        
    
C.  ATTITUDINALLY 
To develop and to fortify confidence in El Salvador, political and civil society 
must face together all the threats to the national security. Everybody’s welfare should be 
a result of commonly shared values, freedom, truth and justice, respect for the law and 
human rights to benefit posterity.  
 
D.  CONSTITUTIONALLY 
In democracies, intelligence systems tend to be a shared responsibility of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Based on this principle, the following suggests 
that democratic laws and procedures can fortify the Salvadoran civil and political society 
toward consolidating its democracy.      
1. Mandate 
The Salvadoran legislation must establish a clear mandate for this service. In 
meeting its mandated commitments the primary mandate of El Salvador Intelligence 
Service, known as Organismo de Inteligencia de Estado (OIE), must be to collect and 
                                                 
124 Mark M. Lowenthal. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press, a division of 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C. 1999. P. 94. 
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analyze information and subsequently to provide reports, in the form of security 
intelligence, to the government.  
The OIE must produce intelligence in order to provide advance warnings to 
government departments and agencies about activities, which may reasonably be 
suspected of constituting threats to El Salvador’s security. Other government departments 
and agencies, not the OIE, must have the responsibility to take direct action to counter the 
security threats.     
As established in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act,125 the OIE must 
not have law enforcement powers. All law enforcement functions should be the 
responsibility of police authorities. The splitting of functions, combined with 
comprehensive legislated review mechanisms, will ensure that the OIE remains under the 
close control of the government.     
The Salvadorian way of life is founded upon recognizing the rights and freedoms 
of the individual. The OIE needs to carry out its role of protecting that style of life with 
respect to those values. To ensure this balanced approach, the OIE Law should strictly 
limit the type of activity that may be investigated, the ways the information can be 
collected and who may view the information.   
2. Structure  
One of the primary values of intelligence gathering is the timely delivery of 
perishable information to policy-makers in government. The seven phases of the process 
that produces these results is known as the “security intelligence cycle,” and they are 
                                                 
125 Taken from: [http://www.csis -scrs.gc.ca/end/backgrnd/back2e.html] 
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described in Chapter II, Process of Intelligence. All of these phases are of equal 
importance, but analysis is considered the mainstay of the process, providing civil and 
military policy makers with information directly related to the issue they face and the 
decisions they have to make.  
Intelligence can be divided into two main categories, External and Internal 
Intelligence. Both must be under the control of the Organismo de Inteligencia de Estado 
(OIE), which is controlled by the president of the republic under the oversight of the 
Legislative and Judicial branches. 
To be effective, efficient, and democratic in every sense, the OIE should create 
three intelligence organisms: Interior Security Intelligence (ISI), Exterior Security 
Intelligence (ESI), which corresponds to the Internal Intelligence, and the Strategic or 
Military Intelligence (SMI), which corresponds to the current External Intelligence. 
These three agencies should be dedicated to these principles: ISI, intelligence to protect 
the Constitution of the Republic and Democracy. ESI, to gather information to political 
and economic information important to the nation’s external policy from foreign states. 
SMI, to produce intelligence for the defense of the nation against external threats, 
maintaining the sovereignty and integrity of the territory.      
More specifically, the internal, known as domestic intelligence (the ISI and the 
ESI) must be the responsibility of the different ministries that constitute the executive 
branch. These intelligence agencies must always be under the control of the OIE and the 
president of the republic. Furthermore, the internal intelligence law should establish this 
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service domestically fulfilling a uniquely defensive role of investigating threats to El 
Salvador’s national security.    
According to the executive’s structure, the Salvadoran Intelligence System can be 
sub-divided into three main branches: internal, economic, and external or foreign affair 
issues. Each branch can be integrated as follows:126 
· Internal Issues:   
        Ministry of Interior 
        Ministry of Education 
        Ministry of Justice 
        Ministry of Health 
        Ministry of Labor 
        Ministry of Public Security 
 
· Economic Issues: 
 Ministry of Economy 
 Ministry of Treasury 
 Ministry of Agriculture  
 
· External or Foreign Issues: 
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
 Diplomatic Body  (oversea)   
                                                 
126 Richard A. Haggerty. El Salvador: A Country Study. Library of the Congress Cataloging-in-
Publication Data, 1990. P. 154. 
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The strategic or military intelligence must be the responsibility of the military, 
under the control of a civil Minister of Defense. It also must have some other divisions, 
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3. Oversight 
In El Salvador, the oversight of intelligence has always been and is still a critical 
problem. According to the present Vice-President of the Republic, Dr. Carlos Quintanilla 
Schmidt, in an interview on January 4, 2001, El Salvador still doesn’t have clear 
legislation for the oversight and control of intelligence activities. He also recognized the 
necessity of new laws to regulate these activities. 
On the other hand, General Fausto Segovia Batres, a member of the Military Joint 
Staff, during an interview on January 3, 2001, explained the ways of controlling the 
military still have to oversight intelligence. And it still lacks congressional oversight and 
control.  
In democracies, oversight tends to be a shared responsibility of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches. The oversight issues are somewhat generic: budget, 
responsiveness to policy needs, control of operations, propriety of activities.           
The Salvadoran legislation must establish a clear mandate for this service, and for 
the first time, legislate a framework of democratic control and accountability for a 
civilian security intelligence service. This system must be composed of a series of 
interlocking parts that ensures open and accountable security intelligence service.   
El Salvador, having a presidential system with the three main branches, executive, 
legislative, and judicial, should construct a system of checks and balances. Within this 
frame, each branch will have the responsibility to oversight the others. In the case of 
intelligence, the oversight can be performed as follows: 
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· The Executive Branch focuses its oversight on issues related to espionage 
and covert actions. The president as the head of the state can ratify any act, should be the 
only leader who can authorize covert action.   
· The Judicial Branch focuses its oversight on the strict fulfillment of the 
laws established in the Constitution of the Republic. Its principal function is to prevent 
the abuses of civil and human rights and not to allow impunity for the guilty.  
· The Legislative Branch, represented by the Legislative Assembly, must 
have the principal tools to oversight, such as budget for the intelligence services, the 
requesting of information and reports, the moment the intelligence commissions require 
such information. Regarding these measures, the following aspects are essential:  
1) Budget: Control over the budget should comprise two activities, authorization 
and appropriation. Authorization will consist of approving specific programs and 
activities that will be funded. Appropriation will consist of allocating specific 
dollars amounts to authorized programs, which should make the following quote 
not only amusing but also true: “Authorizers think they are gods, appropriators 
know they are gods.”127  
2) Hearings: These should also be essential to the oversight process, as a means 
of requesting information from responsible officials and of hearing alternative 
views from outside experts. Hearings could be open to the public or closed, 
depending on the subject under discussion.  
                                                 
127 Mark M. Lowenthal. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press, a division of 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C. 1999. Pp. 136-141.  
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3) Nominations: The power to confirm or reject nominations is an extremely 
political power, which should reside in the Assembly. 
4) Treaties: Advising and consenting to an act of treaty ratification should also be 
a power of the Assembly. Nominations should require a majority vote of the 
deputies; treaties should also require at least a two-third vote of those present in 
the assembly. 
5) Reporting Requirements: Another essential duty of an assembly in a democracy 
is that each branch of the government has the legal right to request information 
that pertains to their func tions. The executive tends to forward information that is 
supportive of its policies; the legislative tends to seek fuller information so as to 
make decisions on more than just the views that the executive volunteers. One of 
the ways in which the Assembly could institutionalize a broad access to 
information is by levying reporting requirements on the executive branch. The 
Legislative Assembly must mandate the executive report on a regular basis (often 
annually) on specific issues, such as human rights practices. The judicial branch 
may request information that assists it in obtaining evidence for a case. 
6) Investigations and Reports: The intelligence committees must report publicly 
on issues that have come before them. These reports may be brief because of 
security concerns, but they will help to assure the rest of the Assembly and the 
public that effective oversight is being conducted, and they can create policy 
documents that the executive must consider. 
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7) Hostages: If the legislative cannot reach an agreement from the executive 
branch on some issue, the legislative can attempt to force the executive branch to 
agree. One way is to withholding actions (commonly termed: “taking hostages”) 
on issues that are important to the executive until the desired action is taken. 
8) Prior Notice and Covert Actions: In new democracies, one of the Assembly’s 
main concerns is that it receives prior notice of presidential actions. Most 
members understand that “prior notice” is not the same as “prior congressional 
approval,” which is required for very few executive decisions. As is the case of 
the United States, one of the areas where prior notice has been fought is covert 
action. As a rule, Congress receives advance notice of a covert action in a process 
that has been largely institutionalized, but successive administrations have refused 
to make prior notice a legal requirement.                         
The oversight system is, of necessity, adversarial but not necessarily hostile. Any 
system that divides power is bound to have debates and friction, but they do not have to 
be played out antagonistically. When antagonism rises, it is more often the effect of 
personalities, issues, and partisanship rather than the oversight system itself.     
 
E.  FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Intelligence is not without its ethical and moral dilemmas, which can be 
excruciating. That these intelligence dilemmas exist also means that policy-makers have 
choices to make that can have ethical and moral dimensions.  
Intelligence, perhaps more than any other government activity, must operate on 
the edge of acceptable morality, occasionally dealing in techniques that would not be 
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acceptable elsewhere in government or private life. For most citizens, the trade-off 
between ethics and increased security is acceptable, provided that the intelligence 
community operates with rules, oversight, and accountability. 
In this sense, the following recommendations must be taken into account to have 
democratic and efficient intelligence services:  
1) A robust system of independent oversight: Without a robust system of 
independent oversight, the intelligence system is wide open to abuse. In most of the cases 
the security services are unable to resist the temptation to indulge activities that have no 
place in a democracy.    
2) Legislative will: The final and the biggest problem of the Legislative oversight 
of the intelligence community is the will to do it. The mechanism to do it must be in 
place. The Assembly must have the power to make the mechanism work. Members of the 
intelligence committees should regard themselves as agents of the Legislative and, 
indeed, of the Salvadoran people to ensure that what the intelligence community does in 
secret is in accord with what the government says in public. The people, perforce, have to 
trust the committees. 
3) Judicial oversight: According to the rule of law, government officials are 
subject to the same rules of law and conduct as are citizens. This should provide one of 
the main checks on the abuse of power by the state or, more precisely, the one means of 
guarding against the guardians.       
3) Analyst’s training: Analysis is the mainstay of the process of intelligence, 
providing civil and military policy makers with information directly related to the issues 
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they face and the decisions they have to make. Analysts must learn to cope with the 
information they get from the collectors and to write as succinctly as possible. Another 
important skill that analysts must learn is objectivity. Every intelligence analyst has three 
wishes: to know everything; to be believed; to influence policy for the good. But they 
main purpose must be to serve in defense of the state.      
In sum, intelligence must be gathered by adhering to such democratic principles 
as transparency and a respect for human rights. A government must establish legal 
mandates and execute oversight at all levels. By following such standards, the abuses of 
human rights and financial abuse and even civil war can be avoided.  
This ideal should stand as the expected role and structure of intelligence systems 
for emerging democracies. When this standard is accomplished, a proper balance 
between the security of the state, all intelligence activities, and a full respect for human 
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